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ABSTRACT
In giving psychological explanations in science and in everyday
contexts, we explain how mental states cause actions in terms
of the contents of the states. This thesis consists of three
papers, each of which explores an issue raised by this fact.
The first paper, 'The Anomalism of Psychology,' addresses
Donald Davidson's claim that cognitive psychology is anomalous
among the sciences, since its use of content as an explanatory
notion makes it incapable of producing strict laws. His
argument against psychophysical laws is based on the claim that
the rational cannot be lawfully correlated with the rational.
So construed, the argument does not appear to succeed. His
argument that there cannot be strict laws within psychology
relies on the claim that we cannot have access to all the
causal influences acting in the psychological domain.
Examination of these arguments suggests that the features of
psychology which, for Davidson, are signs that it is incapable
of producing serious laws, are actually consequences of the
fact that it explains by functional analysis rather than by
subsumption under strict causal laws. Since these are features
shared by other special sciences employing this explanatory
strategy, psychology is not anomalous among the sciences.
The second and third papers are contributions to the
debate about whether mental content is individuated
individualistically, so that it depends only on features of
the individual thinker. Tyler Burge has argued that physically
and functionally identical thinkers may have different thoughts
if they occupy different linguistic environments. The second
paper, 'Constraints on Content,' disputes this claim of Burge's
as he applies it to everyday discourse about mental states.
Cases are presented which show that in giving common sense
explanations of actions, thoughts are individualistically
individuated. The conclusion is that thoughts are sometimes
individuated with respect to linguistic environment, sometimes
individualistically, depending on the purposes of the report.
The third paper, 'Individualism and Semantic Development,'
takes issue with Burge's claim that content individuation in
scientific psychology is uniformly non-individualistic. The
paper outlines current models of semantic development and
presents a thought-experiment showing that psychologists in
this field do not individuate psychological states with respect
to linguistic environment. Possible Burgean objections to the
individualistic interpretation of the thought-experiment are
considered, and comparison is made with Burge's non-
individualistic analysis of Marr's theory of vision.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Ned Block
Title: Professor of Philosophy
3
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
My deepest thanks go to my thesis supervisor, Ned Block, who
worked with me on this project from the beginning. His
perceptive criticisms, astute guidance and friendly
encouragement were always generously given and truly
invaluable. I am also very grateful to Josh Cohen and Stephen
White, the other members of my committee, whose thoughtful
comments on each part of this thesis were of enormous help to
me. I have learned a great deal about doing philosophy from
discussions with the members of my committee; my debt of
gratitude to them is exceeded only by my admiration for their
philosophical skills.
I am grateful too for the comments and criticisms of the many
other faculty members and fellow students who were kind enough
to read drafts of various parts of this thesis. I would like
to thank Michael Antony, Sylvain Bromberger, Ann Bumpus, Dick
Cartwright, John Carriero, Noam Chomsky, David Craiq, Rob
Cummins, Jerry Fodor, Jim Higginbotham, Paul Horwich, Alison
MacIntyre, Jim Page, Jorge Rodriguez, Judy Thomson, Thomas
Uebel, and Catherine Womack for their helpful comments. Thanks
are also due to Susan Carey for a valuable discussion of
semantic development which helped me to improve the third
paper.
I have benefit ed greatly from the opportunity to discuss my
work with Ann Bumpus, David Craig, Jim Page, Jorge Rodriguez
and Catherine Womack. I am very grateful to them for
supportive comments and thoughtful criticisms which helped me
to clarify numerous parts of this thesis.
Finally, I should like to give special thanks to Melanie
Stiassny for her constant support, encouragement and confidence
in me during the writing of this thesis and throughout my time
at MIT.
CONTENTS
The Anomalism of Psychology.............................6
1 Introduction ..........................................*6
2 Psychophysical Laws ............................ 9
3 Purely Psychological Laws..............*..............29
4 Conclusions.................. ......................... 39
References...............................................44
Notes....................... ......................... .... 45
Constraints on Content......................................48
1 Introduction..........................................48
1.1 Burge's Thought-Experiment.......................48
1.2 The Continuity Thesis............................50
2 Arguments for Individualistic Content.................54
2.1 Narrow Content and Causal Powers.................54
2.2 Narrow Content and Point of View................56
2.3 A Different Approach to Individualistic Content..58
2.4 B-Individuation................................60
3 Some Cases of Incomplete Understanding................63
3.1 The Case Of Paul................................63
3.2 Burgean Responses Considered....................65
3.2.1 First Response......................0........65
3.2.2 Second Response..............................66
3.2.3 Third Response...............................67
3.3 Conclusions from the Case of Paul................68
3.4 The Case of Alfred...............................68
3.5 A Thought-Experiment.............................73
3.6 E-Individuation and Expressibility...............75
4 Explanatory States in Common Sense and Cognitive
Psychology........ .... ..................0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 000............0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 80
4.1 Conclusions......................................80
4.2 The Ecumenical View..............................81
Notes........................0............................&83
References .... .. ........... ................................ 84
Individualism and Semantic Development......................85
1 Introduction.............................85
2 Semantic Development....................0............. 88
2.1 Over- and Under-Extensions.................0....88
2.2 Models of Semantic Development...................90
3 A Thought-Experiment..................................96
4 Burgean Objections Considered.........................101
4.1 First Objection...............0000000000......101
4.2 Second Objection.................................105
4.3 Third Objection..................................107
4.4 Fourth Objection............ 0.....................112
4.5 Fifth Objection..................................115
5 Conclusion.................... .....................0 .119
Notes...... ......... .. ............ ....... ...........0  .... 123
References.......... .................................... 124
The Anomalism of Psychologyv.
1 Introduction.
Davidson holds that 'there are no strict deterministic laws on
the basis of which mental events can be predicted and
explained' (ME:208). This claim, the Principle of the Anomalism
of the Mental (PAM), is one of the premises he uses to argue
for his version of the identity theory, anomalous monism, and
as such it has been the topic of much recent discussion. But
PAM is also the basis of Davidson's views on the scientific
standing of cognitive psychology, and in this capacity it has
received relatively little attention. Davidson appears to
regard the potential of a science for producing strict laws as
diagnostic of its scientific standing; he writes that
'by evaluating the arguments against the possibility of
deterministic laws of behaviour, we can test the claims
of psychology to be a science like others (some others)'
(PP :230).
Adhering as he does to PAM, which entails that there is no
possibility of deterministic laws of behaviour, his verdict is
that
'the study of human action, motives, desires, beliefs,
memory, and learning, at least so far as these are
logically tied to the so-called 'propositional
attitudes,' cannot employ the same methods as, and cannot
be reduced to, the more precise physical sciences'
(PP:240).
This quotation could easily be read as disparaging psychology,
as relegating it to the status of a second-class science
incapable of precision; but Davidson subsequently disavowed
this interpretation. In his replies to comments on the paper
quoted above, he maintains that though it may sound as though
he is 'making some sort of attack on psychology generally, or
at least on its right to be called a science,' that was
certainly not his intention (PP:240). His point, he says, is
that 'psychology is set off from other sciences in an important
and interesting way' (PP:241), not that it is inferior to them.
Davidson's final verdict, then, seems to be 'separate but
equal.' However, I believe there are reasons to doubt his
claim that he is not stigmatizing psychology. His view of
scientific explanation makes it difficult to see how any
enterprise incapable of producing strict laws could pass muster
as science. For Davidson, the paradigm of scientific
explanation is explanation in the physical sciences, which he
conceives of as deductive-nomological in form. That is, an
'ideal explanation' consists of 'a description of antecedents
and a specification of laws such that the explanandum can be
deduced' (HEA:263). If the laws specified in such an
explanation are to permit the deduction of the explanandum,
they must be strict and exceptionless; and the stricter the
laws are, the closer the explanation in which they figure to
the ideal. Given this identification of scientific explanation
with subsumption under strict or 'serious' laws (to use
Davidson's term), it follows that where there can be no serious
laws, there can be no serious science. 1 If it is true that as
long as cognitive psychology invokes mental states with
intentional properties, it cannot produce strict laws, and if
strict laws are the sign of respectable science, cognitive
psychology must be deficient as long as it deals with such
states.
The first step towards assessing this conclusion is to
attempt to articulate the arguments for PAM. In doing so, I
hope to show that Davidson's objections are informed by a
particular view of science: genuine science aims to discover
precise, exceptionless causal laws which are used to predict
and explain particular events by deductive subsumption. If this
is so, there are two questions we must ask when assessing the
impact of Davidson's comments on psychology. First, are the
features of psychology which cause it to fall short of the
ideal unique to the field, or will other special sciences fail
for the same reasons? Second, is Davidson's model of ideal
scientific explanation appropriate to practice in cognitive
psychology? If we can answer the first of these questions, we
will see whether Davidson has made good his claim that
psychology is anomalous among the sciences; if we can answer
the second, we will see whether the anomalism of mental events
has any consequences for the status of psychology. I shall
argue that the features of psychology which lead Davidson to
regard it as anomalous are consequences of the fact that it
explains by functional analysis rather than by subsumption
under strict causal laws, which may differentiate it from
physics but does not set it apart from other special sciences
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which employ the same explanatory strategy.
2 Psychophysical Laws.
PAM states that 'there are no strict deterministic laws on the
basis of which mental events can be predicted and explained'
(ME:208). Let us try to get a better grasp of what this claim
involves. Since for Davidson 'events are mental only as
described' (ME:215), PAM will be established if it can be shown
that there can be no strict laws employing mental (or
psychological) descriptions. A description of the form 'the
event that is N' is a mental description, and hence picks out a
mental event, if and only if the expression replacing N
contains a verb of propositional attitude used so as to create
a nonextensional context. The occurrence of a mental event,
then, is the acquisition (or loss) of a propositional attitude.
For present purposes, the noteworthy feature of this criterion
is that it makes processes such as believing, intending,
desiring, remembering, and perceiving paradigmatic of the
mental, and that these can plausibly be regarded as the
processes studied by cognitive psychologists. PAM, if
established, would thus rule out the possibility of strict laws
in the domain of cognitive psychology.
To show that there can be no strict laws containing
mental predicates, Davidson must argue against both
psychophysical laws (laws containing mental and physical
predicates) and purely psychological laws (laws containing
mental predicates alone).2 Before turning to his arguments
9
against strict psychophysical laws, it will be useful to say a
little about Davidson's notion of strictness and about the
types of psychophysical laws against which his argument is
directed. This may be accomplished by considering a distinction
that is central to Davidson's arguments against strict
psychophysical laws, the distinction between homonomic and
heteronomic generalizations.
To describe a statement as homo- or heteronomic is to
comment on the degree to which it is lawlike, and to do this is
to say something about the relationship between the statement
and its instances. 'All emeralds are green' is a lawlike
statement--that is, its instances confirm it (ME:218). 'All
emeralds are grue,' by contrast, receives no inductive support
from its instances; it is not lawlike. Homonomic and
heteronomic statements fall somewhere in between. Both receive
enough support from their instances to act as 'rude rules of
thumb' which are reliable enough for us to use 'in our daily
traffic with events and actions' (ME:219). But the instances of
a homonomic generalization G also give us reason to believe
that a strict law could be attained by adding refinements
stated in the same general vocabulary as G; homonomic
generalizations point 'to the form and vocabulary of the
finished law' (ME:219). The instances of heteronomic
generalizations, by contrast, give us reason to believe that
there is a strict law at work, but one that can be stated only
in a vocabulary different from that of the original
generalization (ME:219).
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Homonomic generalizations, then, can be refined to give
strict laws, but heteronomic ones cannot. But what is it for a
law to be strict? Strict laws, in contrast to 'rude rules of
thumb,' are not only lawlike but 'precise, explicit, and as
exceptionless as possible,' and they are not exceptionless
through containing ceteris paribus clauses (ME:219). Such
psychophysical generalizations as we have are not strict, as
the following passage makes clear:
'if an event of a certain mental sort has usually been
accompanied by an event of a certain physical sort, this
often is good reason to expect other cases to follow suit
roughly in proportion. The generalizations that embody
such practical wisdom are assumed to be only roughly
true, or they are explictly stated in probabilistic
terms, or they are insulated from counterexample by
generous escape clauses.' (ME:219).
As one might expect, Davidson holds not merely that
psychophysical generalizations are not strict, but that they
cannot be made strict; they are not homonomic, but heteronomic.
The details of this argument will occupy us shortly; the point
I want to stress here is that the discussion of homo- and
heteronomicity shows that Davidson's use of 'psychophysical
law' is not as unproblematic as some have assumed it to be.
Often when Davidson's anomalism is discussed it is taken
to be obvious that in speaking of psychophysical laws he is
referring to the putative bridge laws which would be needed to
effect a classical reduction of psychology to, say, physiology-
-the bridge laws which would identify types of mental events
with types of brain events.3 Sometimes Davidson must indeed be
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referring to these; for example, he assumes that showing that
there cannot be strict psychophysical laws is the same as
demonstrating 'the irreducibility of the mental' (ME:215),
using the two formulations of the thesis interchangeably (e.g.
BBM:154). Further, he says that in denying such laws he is
claiming that 'no purely physical predicate, no matter how
complex, has, as a matter of law, the same extension as a
mental predicate' (ME:215); he is denying the 'reducibility [of
mental properties] through law or definition' (ME:214). Such
remarks are surely motivated by the classic view of theory
reduction via bridge laws.
However, it is hardly plausible that our practical
heteronomic wisdom includes rough generalizations associating
brain events of a certain sort with mental events of a certain
sort--that is, rough bridge laws. The rough psychophysical
generalizations Davidson has in mind are causal
generalizations, important for 'the support they lend singular
causal claims and related explanations of particular events'
(ME:219). And if (per imrpossibile, for Davidson) they could be
refined and made strict, they would yield exceptionless causal
laws, not the type-identities expressed by bridge laws.
It is to be expected that Davidson would wish to rule
out both causal and bridge psychophysical laws; to establish
PAM, he must show that there are no laws which can be used to
explain or predict psychological events, which at least
involves ruling out laws of these two types. But if we bear in
mind that the argument against psychophysical laws must apply
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to both causal and bridge laws, we may become suspicious of the
move from the heteronom2Icity of rough causal correlations to
the nomological irreducibility of the mental. Is the
impossibility of psychophysical bridge laws supposed to follow
from the failure of causal laws? Or is the argument intended
to rule out both types of psychophysical law simultaneously?
When we turn to the examination of Davidson's arguments
against psychophysical laws, there seems to be little doubt
that their impossibility is linked to the importance of radical
translation or interpretation in the ascription of
propositional attitudes (i.e., the description of events as
mental). But Davidson's reason for ruling out psychophysical
laws is not, as has been claimed (e.g. Smart 1985:178), that
claims about the mental are indeterminate while claims about
the physical are determinate. The reason Davidson gives for the
impossibility of psychophysical laws is that the rational
cannot be lawfully correlated with the nonrational. The
following crucial passage indicates how it is that the
heteronomicity of psychophysical generalizations 'traces back'
to the indeterminacy of translation:
'This irreducibility [of psychological concepts] is not
due, however, to the indeterminacy of meaning or
translation, for if I am right, indeterminacy is
important only for calling attention to how the
interpretation of speech must go hand in hand with the
interpretation of action generally, and so with the
attribution of desires end beliefs. It is rather the
methods we must invoke in constructing theories of belief
and meaning that ensures the irreducibility of the
concepts essential to those theories. Each interpretation
and attribution of attitude is a move within a holistic
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theory, a theory necessarily governed by concern for
consistency and general coherence with the truth, and
this it is that sets these theories forever apart from
those that describe mindless objects, or describe objects
as mindless.' (BBM:154; emphasis added).
In a gloss on this passage, Davidson emphasizes that even if
indeterminacy of interpretation were somehow eliminated, the
irreducibility of psychological concepts, and hence the
impossibility of psychophysical laws, would remain (RLQ:348-9).
Indeterminacy is important, he claims, because it draws
attention to the fact that a theory of someone's propositional
attitudes is holistic and necessarily governed by
considerations of rationality and truth.
Davidson explicates his claim that rationality is
constitutive of the mental by drawing a parallel between the
attribution of intentional mental states to agents and the
assignment of length to physical objects. The possibility of
assigning numbers to measure length depends on the existence of
a binary relation which is transitive, asymmetric, and holds
throughout the domain of application. This relation is given an
empirical interpretation in terms, for example, of some
procedure. Unless this relation holds throughout the domain, it
will be impossible to demonstrate an isomorphism of structure
between the arithmetic of numbers and the empirical procedures
used to measure length, and thus impossible to justify the use
of a ratio (or even an ordinal) scale. The theory of
fundamental measurement thus limits the domain within which
numbers can meaningfully be used to register length to that
domain where the empirical criteria apply transitively--the
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domain of rigid objects. As Davidson puts it, 'the whole set of
axioms, laws or postulates for the measurement of length is
partly constitutive of the idea of a system of macroscopic,
rigid, physical objects' (ME:221).
Just as certain conditions must be fulfilled if there is
to be a meaningful assignment of numbers to measure length,
there are requirements which must be satisfied if attitudes
with propositional contents are to be attributed to an agent:
'The assignment of numbers to measure [length] assumes
that a very tight set of conditions holds...Just as the
satisfaction of the conditions for measuring length or
mass may be viewed as constitutive of the range of
application of the sciences that employ these measures,
so the satisfaction of conditions of consistency and
rational coherence may be viewed as constitutive of the
range of applications of such concepts as those of
belief, desire, intention and action.' (PP:236-7).
In the case of the attribution of subjective values and
probabilities--the decision-theoretic analogues of desires and
beliefs--the analogy with fundamental measurement in physics
can be made fairly precise. Decision theory as Davidson
describes it defines a rational pattern of preferences as
follows: the preferences must be transitive, asymmetric, and
connected in the set of alternatives, and preferences among
risky alternatives must systematically reflect the assumption
that an alternative is valued in proportion to its perceived
likelihood of producing a valued outcome (HEA:268). As Davidson
remarks, it seems intuitively plausible to say that a pattern
of preferences satisfying these requirements is rational; 'if
someone has a set of preferences that is not rational [as here
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defined], it is possible to make book against him in such a way
that whatever happens he will lose out by his own standards'
(HEA:268; see FTV:145-6 for an example). In addition, though,
their satisfaction ensures that the preference pattern 'can be
proved measurable in the sense of an interval scale' (FTV:153;
see 153-4 for discussion). The enterprise of assigning numbers
to measure the relative strength of subjective values and
probabilities thus commits us to reading rationality into the
pattern of an agent's preferences:
'to the extent that we can see the actions of agents as
falling into a consistent (rational) pattern of a certain
sort, we can explain those actions in terms of a system
of quantified beliefs and desires' (TT:160).
Just as we can use numbers to measure length only to the extent
that the relation 'longer than' is transitive, so we must
strive to interpret the relation 'preferred to' as transitive
if we are to assign numbers to register the relative strength
of desires and beliefs (HEA:273).
Let us grant that it must be possible to find a certain
pattern in an agent's choices before quantified beliefs and
desires can be ascribed, and that the pattern could justly be
described as a rational one. But Davidson evidently holds to a
further claim, namely that conditions of rationality must be
fulfilled if propositional attitudes are to be ascribed at all,
even where the use of numbers to measure their strength is not
in question. 4 The analogy between measurement in decision
theory and fundamental measurement in physics seems to be based
16
on the necessity of setting up a numerical scale in each case;
so what is the argument for the constitutive role of
rationality where it is intentional contents, not numbers,
which are being assigned? Events described as, for example,
believings are described in intentional terms because they are
individuated by their contents, and it is this identification
by content, he claims, which requires that constraints of
rationality be satisfied. 5 Davidson writes that
'The cogency of a teleological explanation [of an action]
rests...on its ability to discover a coherent pattern in
the behaviour of an agent. Coherence here includes the
idea of rationality both in the sense that the action to
be explained must be reasonable in the light of the
assigned desires and beliefs, but also in the sense that
the assigned desires and beliefs must fit with one
another...We weaken the intelligibility of attributions
of thoughts of any kind to the extent that we fail to
uncover a consistent pattern of beliefs and, finally, of
actions, for it is only against a background of such a
pattern that we can identify thoughts.' (TT:159).
This, presumably, is the reason why propositional attitudes are
'intrinsically holistic' (RA:318), since we can ascribe a
single belief or desire to a person only if we also ascribe a
rationally coherent system of attitudes; 'to have a single
propositional attitude is to have...a pattern of beliefs that
logically cohere' (RA:321). But why does the identification of
thoughts require a consistent pattern of beliefs and actions?
According to Davidson 'it is this pattern that determines the
subject matter of the belief, what the belief is about'
(TT:168), and he writes that
'Since the identity of a thought cannot be divorced from
17
its place in the logical network of other thoughts, it
cannot be relocated in the network without becoming a
different thought. Radical incoherence in belief is
therefore impossible' (RA:321) .
The claim that radical incoherence in belief is impossible may
seem overbold, but it has a counterpart in the theory of
measurement in physics; if the predicate 'O(x,y)' gives the
empirical content of 'longer than,' the requirements of
measurement entail that 'there do not exist three objects a, b
and c such that O(a,b), O(b,c) and O(c,a)' (ME:220). Davidson
holds that the assumption of rationality is built into the
attribution of intentional states just as the assumption of
transitivity is built into the application of the concept of
length.
Up to this point, then, Davidson has argued for the
similarities between psychological and physical theories. The
application of both mental and physical concepts is governed by
'certain regulative and constitutive elements' (MM:254),
certain interrelated conditions which must be fulfilled, and
both types of theory are holistic:
'The nomological irreducibility of the mental does not
derive merely from the seamless nature of the world of
thought, preference and intention, for such
interdependence is common to physical theory.' (ME:222).
Thus far physics and psychology are parallel; why, then, are
psychophysical laws impossible? The reason Davidson gives is
the difference between the constitutive elements of
psychological and physical theory. As we have seen, beliefs,
desires and intentions cannot be ascribed individually, on the
18
basis of 'local signs,' but must be ascribed 'within the
framework of a viable theory' (ME: 221); and
'in inferring this system from the evidence, we
necessarily impose conditions of coherence, rationality,
and consistency. These conditions have no echo in
physical theory, which is why we can look for no more
than rough correlations between psychological and
physical phenomena.' (PP:231).
Elsewhere he states that 'there cannot be tight connections
between the realms if each is to retain allegiance to its
proper source of evidence' (ME:222; cf. PP:239). In particular,
there cannot be tight nomological connections between the
mental and physical realms; he claims that 'there are no
psychophysical laws because of the disparate commitments of the
mental and physical schemes' (ME:222).
It appears, then, that Davidson's argument against
psychophysical laws depends on his claim that the attribution
of mental states with propositional contents is necessarily
governed by considerations of rationality and truth, while the
application of physical concepts is governed by a different set
of conditions in which rationality plays no part. But how is
the claim supposed to support the conclusion? Why is it that
the disparity in constitutive elements reveals to us a priori
that there cannot be genuine psychophysical laws? Davidson
writes that 'nomological statements bring together predicates
that we know a priori are made for each other--know, that is,
independently of knowing whether or not the evidence supports a
connection between them' (ME:218); elsewhere he claims that 'it
19
is a relation between predicates that makes a statement
lawlike' (EON:226). 'All emeralds are grue' is not lawlike, in
that it receives no inductive support from its instances;
'emerald' and 'grue' are predicates which are not suited to one
another. This would suggest that the reason psychophysical
generalizations cannot be lawlike is that mental and physical
predicates are not suited to one another; and presumably it is
our knowledge of the disparity in the constitutive commitments
of mental and physical theory which is supposed to indicate to
us that this is so.
However, Davidson does not want to claim that mental and
physical predicates are completely ill-suited. As we noted
earlier, psychophysical statements are not completely
unlawlike; they are heteronomic--roughly reliable, but not
refinable into strict laws, Davidson does not say why it is
that the disparity between the constitutive elements of mental
and physical theory renders psychophysical laws lawlike enough
to be reliable, rather than completely unlawlike. But he does
indicate why it is that these rules of thumb are not homonomic-
-that is, why they cannot be refined to yield strict laws.
Davidson states that
'confidence that a statement is homonomic, correctible
within its own conceptual domain, demands that it draw
its concepts from a theory with strong constitutive
elements (ME:220)
and that
'the existence of lawlike statements in physical science
20
depends upon the existence of constitutive (or synthetic
a priori) laws...within the same conceptual domain'
(ME:221; emphasis added).
These remarks are puzzling, for they appear to indicates two
different reasons for the heteronomicity of psychophysical
laws. The second quotation suggests, as expected, that it is
the fact that psychophysical generalizations bring together
predicates from different domains with different constitutive
elements which is responsible. But the first ties it to the
fact that the theory from which the predicates are drawn lacks
'strong' constitutive elements. Now, Davidson evidently holds
that physical theory has such elements, since their presence is
responsible for the existence of homonomic generalizations in
physical science. He also stresses the parallel between the
constitutive role of rationality in the mental realm and that
of measurement theory in the physical realm, and nowhere
suggests that the constitutive elements of psychology are
weaker than those of physical theory. It therefore seems likely
that both mental and physical theory have strong constitutive
elements, and correspondingly unlikely that the argument rests
on the claim that it is the lack of such elements in psychology
which renders psychophysical generalizations heteronomic.
Perhaps we should reconcile the two quotations by concluding
that constitutive elements can be strong only if they are
unified--that is, only if they are not disparate. This is the
reading I shall adopt.
I see three problems with the claim that psychophysical
21
generalizations cannot be made strict because they contain
predicates drawn from domains with disparate constitutive
elements. The first is that it is simply not clear why
generalizations must contain concepts drawn from a theory with
strong constitutive elements if they are to be homonomic. At
ME:220 Davidson offers an 'illustration' of this claim, the
illustration being the exposition of the '1aws or postulates
for the measurement of length' (ME:221; discussed above, pp. 7-
8). But the difficulty is to see how the illustration supports
the conclusion. The exposition illustrates what strong
constitutive elements are, and shows that physical science has
them; but it does not show that this fact is responsible for
the existence of lawlike statements in the physical sciences,
nor that the absence of such elements entails heteronomicity.
The second problem with this argument is its scope. If,
as Davidson suggests, it is the disparity in constitutive
elements which is responsible for the heteronomicity of
psychophysical laws, the specific nature of the disparity--the
fact that one set of elements involves rationality while the
other does not--is not crucial. Since it seems probable that
the concepts of (at least some) other special sciences are
drawn from theories with constitutive elements which differ
from those of physical theory, the argument will render other
sciences besides psychology nomologically irreducible. Davidson
seems to accept this implication, thinking it likely that 'the
concepts of biology are nomologically irreducible to the
concepts of physics' (PP:241) and that 'most of our practical
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lore (and science) is heteronomic' (ME:219). The fact that the
argument, if sound, implies that we cannot expect strict laws
in other areas does not make it unsound; but it does cause
trouble for Davidson's claim that psychology is 'set off from
the other sciences in an important and interesting way'
(PP:241). He writes that 'the argument against strict
psychophysical laws provides the key to psychology's
uniqueness' (PP:241); but psychology evidently cannot be unique
in being nomologically irreducible in virtue of having
constitutive elements which differ from those of physics. If
this line of argument can secure the anomalism of the mental,
it will do so at the cost of rendering strict laws in many
other domains impossible and thus blurring the desired contrast
between psychology and the other sciences (cf. Lycan 1981:29).
The third problem, alluded to earlier, arises from the
fact that the argument for the heteronomicity of causal
psychophysical laws is also supposed to rule out psychophysical
bridge laws (thus securing the irreducibility of the mental).
The difficulty is that even supposing that the argument from
disparity in constitutive elements to heteronomicity succeeds,
it is very difficult to make sense of the notion of
heteronomicity as applied to bridge laws, rather than causal
laws. To see this, suppose that we have found a rough
statistical correlation between decisions to act (events of
type D) and firings in the premotor area of the brain (events
of type P), and we propose (x)(Dx <-> Px) as a candidate bridge
law. Davidson claims that this cannot be a homonomic
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generalization, since it is psychophysical; it must be
heteronomic. If it is heteronomic, its instantiations will give
us reason to believe that there is a strict law at work which
could be stated in a different vocabulary; this is part of the
definition of heteronomicity. There are two candidates for this
vocabulary. If it is that of the ultimate physical theory which
will yield 'a standardized, unique description of every
physical event' (ME:223), the law will be a statement of self-
identity and so not a law at all. If it is the vocabulary of
what we broadly think of as physical science (which includes
biochemistry and physics), the precise law will state, say,
that some complex biochemical property and some complex
physical property are always coextensive. But surely the
concepts of biochemistry and physics are not drawn from a
unified theory with the same constitutive elements; if 'most of
our science' is heteronomic, it is highly probable that
statements linking biochemical predicates with those of
mathematical physics are just as 'conceptually hermaphroditic'
(PP:241) as psychophysical generalizations. In that case we are
forced back towards the first option, and thus towards the
conclusion that the law supposedly at work cannot be made
strict. If this is so, there cannot be strict bridge laws
underlying rough psychophysical bridge laws, and it is
therefore hard to see how the latter can truly be described as
heteronomic. Davidson could revise his claim and hold only that
psychophysical bridge laws are not homonomic (not refinable
into strict laws), or he could drop the requirement that strict
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laws underlie heteronomic laws; but a more basic problem would
remain. That problem is that the argument from disparate
commitments seems to show that no bridge law can be strict,
since all such laws are of their nature conceptually
hermaphroditic. If this is the case no special science will be
reducible to physics (at least via strict bridge laws). It
seems unwise to accept an argument with such a strong
conclusion, unless further support is given for the claim that
strong constitutive elements are required if strict laws are to
be attainable.
Perhaps the central difficulty with Davidson's argument
against psychophysical laws is that raised by the first
objection--the fact that he offers so little discussion of why
disparity in the constitutive elements of two theories gives us
reason to rule out the possibility that statements linking them
could be strictly lawlike. We are apt to feel that this is just
not the sort of consideration that could justify us in
disqualifying such an eventuality in advance. This feeling is
surely not due to the fact that we have a good grasp of the
sort of evidence that would justify such a decision, but to the
fact that, as Davidson puts it, 'in general the grounds for
deciding to trust a statement on the basis of its instances
will...be governed by theoretical and empirical concerns not to
be distinguished from those of science' (ME:216). To this
Davidson responds as follows:
'If the case of supposed laws linking the mental and the
physical is different, it can only be because to allow
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the possibility of such laws would amount to changing the
subject. By changing the subject I mean here: deciding
not to accept the criterion of the mental in terms of the
vocabulary of propositional attitudes.' (ME:216) .
When set beside Davidson's claim that there cannot be tight
connections between the mental and physical realms 'if each is
to retain allegiance to its proper source of evidence'
(ME:222), this remark suggests a strategy for deriving the
impossibility of psychophysical laws from disparity in
constitutive commitments. The strategy (which has a long
history) is to argue that admitting the possibility of
psychophysical laws is admitting the possibility that
propositional attitudes could be attributed on the basis of
physical evidence; bridge laws would allow attitudes to be
ascribed on the basis of brain states, causal laws on the basis
of physical causes. But then considerations of rationality
would no longer have primacy in the ascription of attitudes,
and the theory of an agent's attitudes is necessarily governed
by concern for rationality and coherence (BBM:154). Therefore
there cannot be strict psychophysical laws; to accept that
there can be is to be guilty of 'changing the subject' (ME:216)
by allowing the considerations of rationality which are
constitutive in the psychological realm to be overridden by
physiological evidence.
It is surely true that we would search for candidate
psychophysical laws by first attributing mental states (in
accordance with rationality) and then looking for physical
events that regularly accompanied the occurrence of those
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states. In this sense, considerations of rationality would have
primacy in our attempt to identify the physical correlates of
psychological events. But the argument purports to show that
such correlations as we might propose could not hold up. Let us
imagine that we have repeatedly found mental events of type 11
to be accompanied by (or caused by) neurological events of type
N1 . Now, it is always possible that this correlation should
break down--if, say, we find a subject whom we interpret as
showing 11 without N1. The Davidsonian point is that in such
cases the correlation breaks down because we do not allow the
physical evidence to condition our intentional attributions;
our ascriptions of reasons and intentions are governed by
'considerations of overall cogency' (ME:223), by the
requirement of finding the agent rationally intelligible, and
not by observed regularities in brain events. Perhaps this
qualifies an instance in which the disparity in the commitments
of the mental and physical schemes can be used to argue that
observations of psychophysical correlations do not confirm
exceptionless psychophysical laws.
Insofar as this argument relies on the logical
possibility that the putative law might break down, it is
implausible; a law sets limits on what is physically possible,
not on what is logically possible. It is not enough that the
uniformity might break down; to be successful, the argument
must persuade us that no matter how often we observed the
correlation, we would never have reason to believe it more than
roughly true. (Recall that psychophysical generalizations are
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supposed to be heteronomic, not unlawlike.) It seems somewhat
implausible that if the correlation were observed often enough,
we would not eventually come to regard it as a genuine
psychophysical law. But let us suppose that the one-one
correlation does break down as envisaged. We would surely
conclude from this that mental events of type Il are physically
instantiated in different ways in different brains (or in the
same brain at different times). If this were the case for
mental events in general, we would not be able to give
necessary and sufficient conditions for the occurrence of a
mental event in physical terms.
Would this mean that there could be no strict lawlike
links between the mental and the physical? It does not seem
impossible that at some point in the future our knowledge of
psychology and physiology might reach a point at which we could
demonstrate, say, that any system capable of solving complex
problems as quickly as we do would have to be composed of
neuron-like material. Such laws would impose physical
constraints on possible instantiations of our cognitive
capacities, but they would not be bridge laws enabling us to
reduce psychology to physics. The possibility of such
instantiation laws thus does not threaten Davidson's claim that
psychology is nomologically irreducible to physical science.
But it does suggest that the Davidsonian objections we have
considered do not suffice to rule out the possibility of strict
lawlike links between the mental and the physical.
The conclusion towards which the discussion has so far
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been tending is that it is difficult to find a construal of
Davidson's argument against psychophysical laws which does not
face substantial problems. The argument seeras to render other
special sciences nomologically irreducible; and though it may
draw attention to the possibility of multiple physical
realizations of mental events, it leaves open the possibility
of psychophysical instantiation laws. However, even if an
argument could be constructed which would show psychology to be
anomalous among the sciences in being irreducible, the question
of the anomalism of the mental would remain. The mental is
anomalous only if both psychophysical and purely psychological
laws are impossible. Let us now turn to Davidson's arguments
against the latter.
3 Purely Psychological Laws.
If psychophysical laws are ruled out by the nomological
incompatibility of psychological and physical predicates, might
we expect laws employing psychological predicates alone?
Davidson's remark that generalizations which draw their
concepts from a theory with 'strong constitutive elements' may
be expected to be homonomic makes the prospects seem
favourable. The claim that psychology has constitutive elements
is an integral part of the argument against psychophysical
laws, and though it is not clear what the force of 'strong' is
here, Davidson does not suggest that the constitutive elements
of psychology are weaker than those of physical science.
However, statements which are homonomic must also draw their
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concepts 'from a comprehensive closed theory' (ME:219), and
psychology does not meet this requirement:
'the mental does not, by our first principle [at least
some mental events interact causally with physical
events], constitute a closed system. Too much happens to
affect the mental that is not itself a systematic part of
the mental.' (ME:224; cf. PP:231, 241).
Davidson uses instances of action and perception to illustrate
the interaction of mental and physical events. Perception shows
that, as he puts it elsewhere, 'psychological events and states
often have causes that have no natural psychological
descriptions' (PP:241).6 This non-closure of the mental is the
sole reason which Davidson gives for the impossibility of
psychological laws; conjoined with the argument against
psychophysical laws, it is supposed to secure the anomalism of
the mental. But the reason seems a peculiar one. It is hard to
see why the interaction of psychological and physical events
should have such a sweeping consequence; if it did, we would
have an a priori argument against the possibility of there
being laws of any special sciences (i.e. sciences other than
physics). The fact that psychology deals with the realm of the
rational would play no part in securing the anomalousness of
psychological events. Any special science deals with the
restricted domain of events describable in its specialized
vocabulary, events which interact with others not describable
in this way; for example, the proliferation of cancer cells (a
biological event) is sometimes caused by ultra-violet
irradiation (a physical event without a natural biological
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description). Of course the interactions of psychological
events with physical events could not be explained or predicted
on the basis of purely psychological laws, but this in itself
seems to provide no reason for doubting the possibility of such
7laws.
Though Davidson's official reason for ruling out purely
psychological laws appears problematic, we may be able to
gather some clues to his objection to them, and to his notions
of comprehensiveness and closure, by looking at his discussion
of laws linking reasons and actions. Davidson does not
explicitly designate such laws as psychological, and the
remarks we will consider are intended to contribute to the
argument against psychophysical laws by demonstrating the
pervasiveness of considerations of rationality in the
psychological sphere. But reasons and intentional actions
clearly fall within the realm of the mental for Davidson, so
laws linking them can justly be described as purely
psychological.
The conclusion of Davidson's discussion is, as might be
expected, that 'there are no serious laws of this kind [sc.
reason-action laws]' (PP:233). He tells us that what rules out
such laws is also what prevents us from giving necessary and
sufficient conditions for acting intentionally (PP:233). To see
this, we must consider the form which Davidson's reason-action
laws would have to take if they were to be serious. That form
is as follows: 'whenever a man has such-and-such beliefs and
desires, and such-and-such further conditions are satisfied, he
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will act in such-and-such a way' (PP:233). Davidson says
elsewhere that a law of this form 'would be understood as a
causal law, of course, but it would not need to mention
causality' (FA:80). If we had such laws, we would be able to
give causal deductive-nomological explanations and predictions
of roughly the following form:
(L) Whenever a man has such-and-such beliefs and desires and
such-and-such further conditions are satisfied, he will
act in such-and-such a way.
(C) A at t has such-and-such beliefs and desires and such-
and-such further conditions are satisfied.
(E) A will act in such-and-such a way at t.
(L) here is a schematic causal law, the antecedent of which
must be filled in to give the conditions which are causally
necessary and sufficient for an intentional action to occur.
But what does the problem of filling in the conditions under
which a reason will cause an action have to do with the problem
of giving a reductive analysis of the concept of intentional
action? The connection is that in Davidson's view an action is
intentional in virtue of its causal history.
According to his causal analysis of intentional action,
to act intentionally is to act on a reason, and an agent acts
on a reason only if the reason causes the action (I:87). This
is intuitively plausible; I might have many good reasons for
acting as I did, and yet not have acted thus for those reasons.
The reason for which I acted as I did is the reason which
caused me to act as I did. It is a necessary condition, then,
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for an action to be intentional that it be caused by a reason.
Is this also sufficient? Davidson offers a case to show that
it is not.
'A climber might want to rid himself of the weight and
danger of holding another man on a rope, and he might
know that by loosening his hold on the rope he could rid
himself of that weight and danger. This belief and want
might so unnerve him as to cause him to loosen his hold,
and yet it might be the case that he never chose to
loosen his hold, nor did he do it intentionally' (FA:79).
Here the belief and desire are such as to make the climber's
loosening his hold a rational thing to do, and they do cause
him to loosen his hold, yet they do not cause the loosening in
such a way as to make it intentional. For an action to be
intentional, it must not only be caused by a belief and a
desire which provide a reason for doing it, it must also be
caused by them 'in the right way, perhaps through a chain or
process of reasoning that meets standards of rationality'
(PP:232). But if Davidson is right, we cannot fill in the
further conditions mentioned in (L) in a non-questionbegging
way. Our attempts to fill (L) out are not 'serious laws'
because their antecedent conditions cannot be specified in a
way which makes it possible to test whether they are fulfilled
in advance of the occurrence of the event to be explained.
'What is needed, if reason explanations are to be based on
laws, is...a test...of when a person's reasons--his desires and
beliefs---will result, in the right way, in an action'
(HEA:267). Without an account of how reasons are weighed, we
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cannot predict which one will be acted upon, although we can
retrospectively identify some reason as the cause of an action
which has occurred. He writes that
'Explanation by reasons avoids coping with the complexity
of causal factors by singling out one, something it is
able to do by omitting to provide, within the theory, a
clear test of when the antecedent conditions hold.'
(PP:233).
So it seems that if we understood 'the way in which desire and
belief work to cause the action' we would know the complex
causal conditions for intentional action, we would have a clear
test of when the conditions held, and we could generate some
serious psychological laws and use them to predict actions.
However, Davidson appears to rule out such an
understanding:
'What is needed in the case of action, if we are to
predict on the basis of desires and beliefs, is a
quantitative calculus that brings all relevant beliefs
and desires into the picture. There is no hope of
refining the simple pattern of explanation on the basis
of reasons into such a calculus' (PP:233).
Elsewhere he supports this claim by pointing to the explanatory
poverty of the practical syllogism:
'Any serious theory for predicting action on the basis of
reasons must find a way of evaluating the relative force
of various desires and beliefs in the matrix of decision;
it cannot take as its starting point the refinement of
what is to be expected from a single desire. The
practical syllogism exhausts its role in displaying an
action as falling under one reason; it cannot be
subtilized into a reconstruction of practical reasoning,
which involves the weighing of competing reasons'
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(ARC: 16).
This passage suggests that though the practical syllogism is
too crude, decision theory, which 'offers a more sophisticated
way of dealing with reason explanations' (HEA:268), might
provide serious laws for predicting actions.
Davidson does not state explicitly why it is that
decision theory cannot yield such laws, but his discussion
suggests an argument which might be offered to support the
claim. Recall that decision theory, as Davidson describes it,
specifies a set of conditions on a rational pattern of
preferences. If a subject S has such a pattern of preferences,
numbers can be assigned to measure the relative value and
subjective probability which various outcomes have for S. The
theory also claims that a subject with a rational pattern of
preferences always chooses an outcome such that no other has a
higher expected value (HEA:268). Why is it that such a theory
of decision is not a 'scientific theory of behaviour' (PP:235)?
Davidson's discussion of decision theory suggests that
the problem is that the theory suffers from the same defect as
the reason-action laws mentioned earlier; we do not have a
clear test of when it holds. To determine whether decision
theory is true of some subject S, we must discover whether S
has a rational pattern of preferences. To do this, we need to
give what Davidson calls 'a clear behaviouristic
interpretation' to the claim 'S prefers A to B' (PP:270). The
problem is that our standard for accepting a proposed
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interpretation is that the assignments of subjective
probability and value it generates make S's choices appear
rational. We thus cannot determine subjects' values and
probabilities independently of deciding to see them as acting
to maximize expected value (HEA:272). But if we can only say
that the theory applies wherever we can make it apply, we
evidently cannot state its conditions of application in a way
which does not beg the question. And if we cannot give a clear
test of when the theory applies, we cannot use it to predict
actions.
If this is Davidson's objection to strict purely
psychological laws, and hence to a scientific psychology, we
should note that its scope appears to be rather limited. It
seems that it casts doubt on the possibility of a scientific
psychology only if a scientific psychology is identified with a
set of laws for explaining and predicting action, and only if
decision theory is our best prospect for producing such laws.
But these are premises which Davidson simply assumes; they are
not argued for. In fact, all the arguments against purely
psychological laws discussed above are informed by a specific
conception of the form a genuine scientific theory should take.
Let us pause to illustrate this before inquiring whether this
form is the form taken by psychology.
Davidson's official reason for ruling out strict purely
psychological laws is that psychological events interact with
non-psychological events, but his remarks on the practical
syllogism and and on decision theory seem to indicate a
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different reason. His objection to reason-action laws stresses
the impossibility of specifying 'the way desire and belief work
to cause the action' (PP:233), while the objection to decision-
theoretic laws turns on the impossibility of gaining
independent access to the values and beliefs which cause
choices. Despite their differences, however, all three
arguments could be taken to suggest that psychology does not
constitute a 'closed, comprehensive' theory. The 'non-closure'
argument points to the fact that the events which psychology
attempts to explain and predict are affected by events which do
not fall within the domain of psychological theory, while the
other two arguments imply that explanation in terms of beliefs
and desires (or beliefs and values) is incapable of taking into
account all the causal factors contributing to intentional
action. Together, the arguments purport to show that there are
psychological and non-psychological influences on psychological
events which cannot be taken into account in psychological
explanation. Perhaps the fundamental objection against purely
psychological laws is that they could not be strict and
predictive as long as the events they aim to predict are
subject to causal influences which are not characterizable or
quantifiable within the theory.
Uncovering this underlying objection not only reveals the
links between closure, comprehensiveness, and strictness, but
also shows that the objection against purely psychological laws
is based on an extremely restrictive view of what constitutes
genuine science. Basic physics is genuine science, for
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Davidson, since it does provide a closed, deterministic system
(ignoring quantum indeterminacy, as he notes) of precise,
exceptionless causal laws (ME:224). The precision of these laws
means that they can be causal without mentioning causality;
Davidson writes that if we had genuine reason-action laws
'We would simply say, given these (specified) conditions,
there always is an intentional action of a specified
type. This would be understood as a causal law, of
course, but it would not need to mention causality.
Unavoidable mention of causality is a cloak for
ignorance; we must appeal to the notion of cause when we
lack detailed and accurate laws' (FA:80).8
The notion of causality and explanation at work here is
instantly recognizable in this passage from Hempel:
'the everyday conception of causal explanation is rather
narrow and vague and...at least in physics it has been
replaced by the more general and precise conception of an
explanation by means of a deterministic theory...[G]iven
the "state" of a closed system...at some time, the theory
determines the state of the system at any other time and
thus permits the explanation of a particular state of the
system by reference to an earlier one.' (Hempel
1965:487n).
Given a closed system and a deterministic theory, on this view,
there is a 'structural equality of explanation and prediction'
(Hempel 1965:234); an event (a change in the system) is
predicted or explained by being deduced from the prior state of
the system using the laws. The fact that the PAM states that
there are no laws on the basis of which mental events can be
predicted or explained, suggests that Davidson too regards
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these as symmetrical; elsewhere he writes that psychological
events are not 'amenable to precise prediction or subsumption
under exceptionless causal laws' (PP:239). There is little
doubt that for Davidson a genuinely scientific theory is one
which provides precise, exceptionless causal laws which are
used to predict and explain particular events by deductive
subsumption. The laws of such a theory are exceptionless
because the theory takes into account all the causal factors
affecting events in its domain, not (as in psychology) because
they are insulated from counterexample by ceteris paribus
clauses.
4 Conclusions.
If Davidson's criticisms of psychology are based on the
assumption that it attempts (without success, of course) to
provide a closed, deterministic theory yielding strict causal
laws of behaviour, we need to ask whether this La what
psychology aims to do. We may suspect that it is not when we
note that research in cognitive psychology is typically
directed to explaining capacities, such as memory, language
comprehension, and problem-solving, rather than to predicting
when and how people will act intentionally. Moreover, there is
a plausible model of psychological explanation which portrays
it not as subsumption under causal law, but as functional
analysis. My aim here is not to defend the details of this
account; that is ably done elsewhere (Cummins 1983, Haugeland
1981), and I shall only give a brief sketch of the ways in
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which it differs from the subsumptive model. But the sketch
will, I hope, suffice to suggest that the features of
psychology which for Davidson indicate that it is not genuine
science are rather consequences of the fact that it explains by
the analysis of capacities rather than by the subsumption of
events. If this is so, he cannot construe them as indications
that psychology is an inferior science without giving us
convincing reason to believe that this type of explanation is
itself inferior.
To say that psychology explains cognitive capacities by
giving a functional analysis, is to say that the capacities are
explained by showing how simpler functional units could be
organized to form a system with the cognitive capacities in
question. If it were possible to see how the simpler functions
could be carried out by a physical system, it would be
intelligible how the overall cognitive capacity could be
physically instantiated. Such a theory would enable us to show
how the capacity is instantiated in a particular type of
system, rather than giving us causal laws subsuming changes of
state in a particular type of system, but it would still yield
explanations of psychological phenomena. Though we would not be
able to predict psychological events with complete certainty
(for reasons to be discussed shortly), we would be able to
understand how they could come about by understanding them as
the results of the exercise of a cognitive capacity, and
explaining how the capacity was instantiated in the system.
The hypothesis that psychology yields functional
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explanations would show why we cannot expect to find
psychophysical bridge laws. Even though we might be able to
discover how some cognitive capacity is instantiated in a
particular type of physical system (our brains, say), it would
remain impossible to give necessary and sufficient physical
conditions for the instantiation of the capacity in question.
Physically diverse components, organized in different ways,
could carry out the functions necessary to endow a system with
the cognitive capacity in question. But we cannot give
necessary and sufficient physical conditions for being a clock,
either, for the class of clocks is functionally defined 9 (they
are used for something--to tell the time), and functional
definitions do not translate into first-order physical terms.
As Cummins remarks, 'multiple instantiation blocks reduction
because there are truths about the instantiated property that
are not truths about the instantiations' (1983:23). But then
any science which uses the method of functional analysis will
produce theories which are 'irreducible' in the sense of not
yielding biconditional bridge laws; psychology is no worse off
than, say, biology. 1 0  (Davidson remarks at one point that he
suspects that biology also cannot be a 'closed science,' but
that he does not know 'how to show that the concepts of biology
are nomologically irreducible to the concepts of physics'
PP:241.) Davidson's stress on psychological methodoloay was at
least suggestive.
Seeing psychological explanation as functional analysis
also reveals the sense in which psychology does not constitute
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a closed system and cannot produce strict laws. We are
supposing that psychology explains by giving analyses of
complex capacities into subcapacities, and repeating this
process for the subcapacities until the level of physical
instantiation is reached. Now, suppose that we had accomplished
a full functional analysis of some psychological capacity C,
and explained how it was instantiated in some physical system
S. It would seem that we could use the analysis to predict the
effects of some input on S given its initial state. But of
course our predictions would hold only as long as the system
was functioning correctly; they would not themselves allow us
to predict and allow for physical changes in S which would stop
it from instantiating our analysis of C (cf. Lycan 1981:30).
Such changes could be predicted and explained at the physical
level (though not, of course, a malfunctions) but they could
not be taken into account at the psychological level. Our
predictions would always be subject to the proviso that the
system be functioning correctly; and it might well be that the
only way for us to tell that it is functioning correctly is to
see whether it behaves in accordance with our predictions. In
this sense we cannot 'determine in advance whether the
conditions of application [i.e. normal functioning] are
satisfied' (PP:233). But this limited predictive power is not a
failing of the explanatory strategy of psychology; the aim of
the strategy is to see the behaviour of cognitive systems as
manifestations of capacities which we understand, not to
predict when those systems will cease to possess those
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capacities.
Perhaps our conclusion should be that what Davidson has
been pointing to is the anomalism of the functional--the fact
that sciences employing the strategy of functional analysis are
not reducible and do not yield strict causal laws. But this
type of anomalism cannot be construed as a defect of the
sciences in question, since they do not attempt to explain the
phenomena in their domains by subsuming them under such laws.
Though they may not yield strict causal laws, they can still
yield satisfying explanations by showing how complex biological
and psychological capacities could be instantiated in matter.
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£ootnotesa.
1 It might seem that this reasoning would show that quantum
physics is not a serious science, because it deals in
probabilistic rather than exceptionless laws--a conclusion
Davidson would wish to avoid. But the laws of physics,
though probabilistic, are what Davidson calls 'serious'; he
writes that 'the statistical laws of physics are serious
because they give sharply fixed probabilities, which spring
from the nature of the theory.' (PP:233).
2 Some terminology: in this paper I shall follow Davidson in
using 'mental' and 'psychological' interchangeably. By
'psychological laws' I shall mean any laws employing some
mental vocabulary. The category of psychological laws thus
includes both psychophysical and purely psychological laws.
3 Some examples: Haugeland 1981:252; Elgin 1980.
4 This further claim may not be required to establish
Davidson's desired conclusion, but he does appear to endorse
it,
5 Earlier it was noted that for Davidson an event is mental iff
it has a description containing at least one propositional
attitude verb, used non-extensionally (ME:210); the feature
which he takes to be distinctive of the mental is that 'it
exhibits what Brentano called intentionality' (ME:211). Yet
it is apparently rationality, rather than intentionality,
which sets the mental apart from the physical. Davidson
therefore needs to show why it is that the intentional can
be assimilated to the rational.
6 Davidson's reasons for holding that the mental is not closed
are curious when viewed as part of an argument for monism.
Until monism is established, the fact that some mental and
physical events interact causally should suggest that
neither the mental nor the physical constitutes a closed
system, so the passage from ME:224 quoted in the text does
not appear to justify the asymmetry. The second formulation
(from PP:241) fares better only if it is plausible that
physical events and states do not have causes which have no
natural physical descriptions. (To take this as obvious is
surely to assume monism.) The plausibility of the claim
depends on which descriptions are 'natural'. If my arm
moves because I want it to, is there a natural physical
description of the cause of the movement? It seems most
natural to say that it was caused by my desire. To say that
the movement is caused by some physical event in my nervous
system may be natural for an identity theorist, but it begs
the question.
45
7 The Principle of Causal Interaction plus the impossibility of
psychophysical laws would yield the conclusion that there
were some psychological events which psychology could not
predict or explain (e.g. perceptions). But this is weaker
than the Principle of the Anomalism of the Mental, which
states that nra psychological events can be predicted or
explained (under their psychological descriptions). The
weaker claim reveals a sense in which the psychological does
not constitute a closed system; but one still wants to know
why this lack of closure prevents purely psychological laws.
8 Compare: 'Strict laws do not deploy disposition terms nor do
they use causal concepts' (RS:246). The ineliminable
reference to causality in our talk of the relationship
between mental states and actions is a result of our
inability to state 'the causal conditions of intentional
action...in a way that would eliminate wrong causal chains'
(FA:80), and is a symptom of the impossibility of making
reason-action generalizations strict by stating their
antecedent conditions precisely.
9 The horological example is McGinn's (1978:199; 1980:180).
McGinn's construal of Davidson is in some respects similar
to mine, but I am not persuaded of his conclusion that
'mental states enjoy no sort of real essence whatsoever'
(1978:201).
10 Perhaps I should say that in general any science invoking
properties with variable physical instantiations will be
irreducible to physics. Perhaps this would explain why the
physical terms of our 'practical lore' (e.g. 'window',
'rock', ARC:16) are heteronomic with respect to the
predicates of physics.
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SECOND PAPER
CONSTRAINTS ON CONTENT
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Constraints on Content.
1 Introduction.
1.1 Burge's Thought-Experiment.
Some recent studies of how the content of intentional mental
states is individuated in ordinary discourse have caused much
debate. These studies are striking because they are taken to
show that the contents of a person's thouchts are not
determined by (do not supervene on) his or her
phenomenological, functional or physiological states. The
contents of a person's thoughts, it is claimed, may be
affected by features of the external environment of which he
or she is entirely ignorant. The arguments which are taken
to lend support to this conclusion are described in Putnam
(1975) and Burge (1979). The argumentative strategy is to test
claims about the determinants of mental content by describing
thought-experiments in which physically and functionally type-
identical subjects occupy different environments. It is then
argued that our practice of thought attribution dictates that
such subjects have propositional attitudes with different
1
contents, since different belief ascriptions are true of them.
The topic of this paper is the ingenious thought-experiment
described by Burce (1979) and the conclusion he draws from it.
Burge's conclusion is that the linguistic practices of the
community to which a person belongs partly determine the
contents of his or her intentional mental states. The thought-
experiment held to support it can be described as follows.
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Burge invites us to consider an English-speaker--let us
call her Jane--who misuses the word 'arthritis', applying it to
rheumatoid diseases in the bones as well as in the joints.
This, Burge argues, does not prevent us from reporting her
beliefs using ascriptions in which the word 'arthritis' occurs
in the content-clause. Suppose that Jane says to her doctor 'I
have arthritis in my thigh,' that the doctor replies 'You can't
have arthritis in the thigh; arthritis is a disease of the
joints,' and that Jane accepts that her belief was false. It
seems that the natural way for us to report the belief she
expressed is with
(1) Jane believes that she has arthritis in her thigh.
We then consider what beliefs she would have had if she had
been a member of a different linguistic community in which the
word 'arthritis' was correctly applied to rheumatoid diseases
of the bones as well as the joints. The counterfactual
condition differs only in that in it correct use encompasses
Jane's actual misuse; Jane's functional and physical
constitution remains the same. Let us call Jane in this
counterfactual condition 'Jane2.' Jane2 also utters the words
'I have arthritis in my thigh'; but in so doing, Burge argues,
she expresses a belief not about arthritis but about the more
inclusive group of rheumatic conditions. This being so, we
cannot report this belief in the same way we reported Jane's;
Jane2 does not believe that she has arthritis in her thigh.
Thus Jane has at least one belief which Jane2 lacks. Since
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jane and Jane2 are physically and functionally identical and
differ only in the linguistic communities to which they belong,
the difference in their belief contents must be attributed to
the difference in their linguistic environments. Burge
concludes that 'propositional attitudes depend partly for their
content on social factors independent of the individual
asocially and non-intentionally construed' (1979:85).
Burqe's conclusion challenges what he calls the
'individualistic presuppositions' of many traditional Nviews of
the mind (1979:94). According to such views, the thoughts a
person has are determined by intrinsic properties of that
person--properties he or she has taken in isolation from the
external environment. Let us say that thoughts which thus
supervene on individual constitution have individualistic or
narrow content, and let us call the individuative practice
which picks them out individualistic individuation. We may
then say that Burge takes himself to have shown that our
everyday practice of propositional attitude ascription is non-
individualistic, and that the thoughts we attribute to one
another in ordinary discourse have non-individualistic or
'wide' content.
1.2 The Continuity Thesis.
Burge's conclusion that the content of propositional attitudes
is partially determined by linguistic environment, if
warranted, casts doubt on any theory of propositional attitudes
whica represents them as having individualistic content. In
particular, it casts doubt on the thesis (which I shall call
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the Continuity Thesis) that common sense explanations of
behaviour in terms of beliefs, desires and other propositional
attitudes will be vindicated by cognitive psychology, in that
cognitive psychology will invoke explanatory states with the
properties of common sense mental states. If we make the
plausible and widely-held assumption that the psychological
states of cognitive psychology are individualistically
individuated, in that they are not dependent on linguistic
usage in the community to which the subject belongs, it is hard
to see how the Continuity Thesis can be true. According to
Burge, propositional attitudes are non-individualistically
individuated; so his conclusion, if warranted, would show that
the psychological states invoked by cognitive psychology and
the intentional states ascribed in common sense discourse have
different identity conditions. Two people with identical
psychological states might yet have different propositional
attitudes if they belonged to different linguistic communities.
Burge's conclusion indicates a substantial dissimilarity in the
explanatory states invoked in cognitive psychology and in
common sense; the prospects for the Continuity Thesis seent dim.
I should note that this is not a conclusion Burge
would accept, since he holds that the explanatory states of
cognitive psychology, like those of common sense, are
individuated with respect to the environment. He has argued
that Marr's theory of vision invokes representational states
whose content depends on the nature of the subject's physical
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environment. But this claim does not suggest that any part of
cognitive psychology attributes states which are sensitive to
subjects' linguistic environments. Nor does the argumentative
strategy Burge there employs readily generalize to the
linguistic case. He relies on the claim that the content of a
representational state of type R in an environment E depends on
what features of E normally cause tokens of R (Burge 1986:32).
He concludes from this that changes in environmental features
can change the contents of representational states. But in the
linguistic case, the norms of usage which supposedly affect the
contents of a subject's beliefs are not the causes of those
beliefs, so the assumption of a causal theory of content is no
help here. In any case, the question we are concerned with is
whether Burge's thought-experiment should lead someone who
believes that cognitive psychology is individualistic to
abandon the Continuity Thesis, so I shall assume that cognitive
psychology does individuate intentional states
individualistically.
Reactions to the challenge presented to the Continuity
Thesis by Burge's conclusion have, by and large, taken two
forms. One response has been to accept that Burge has shown
that psychological states and propositional attitudes are
individuated in very different ways. I shall say that
proponents of this response adopt the Schismatic View, since
they concur in embracing the idea that the propositional
attitudes and psychological states attributed in common sense
contexts and in cognitive psychology respectively have
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different identity conditions. They concur in little else,
however, for some holders of the Schismatic View champion
cognitive psychology as the true theory of the mental (e.g.
Stich) while others suggest that cognitive psychology has been
shown to be unable to capture an essential feature of the
2
mental (e.g. Pettit and McDowell 1986:14).
The other response to Burge's challenge to the
Continuity Thesis consists in the adoption of some variety of
what I shall call the Ecumenical View. This is the view that
we can extract a notion of individualistic content from
common sense practice as well as the non-individualistic
notion to which Burge draws attention. If the Ecumenical
View can be defended, there is at least a possibility that
the Continuity Thesis may be reinstated, for content
individuation in common sense and in cognitive psychology
will have been shown to have individualistic elements.
The aim of this paper is to argue that content
individuation in common sense discourse is not uniformly non-
individualistic. I shall defend a version of the Ecumenical
Thesis, not out of allegiance to the Continuity Thesis, but
because I doubt that Burge's thought-experiment gives us reason
to reject the Ecumenical View in favour of the drastic
Schismatic alternatives. In fact it seems that the Ecumenical
View provides a more accurate picture of our common sense
practice of attitude ascription. I shall present some examples
which suggest that when giving common sense explanations of
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action we do not individuate thoughts with reference to agents'
linguistic environment, as Burge maintains we do. If mental
states are individuated in the same way (i.e.
individualistically) in common sense and in scientific
explanations, the challenge supposedly presented to the
Continuity Thesis by Burge's thought-experiment is rebuffed.
Before elaborating on these claims, I shall examine the
two lines of argument most commonly offered to support the
introduction of a common sense notion of individualistic or
narrow content. Determining the ways in which these arguments
fall short will point the way to a more satisfactory defence.
2 Arguments for Individualistic Content.
2.1 Narrow Content and Causal Powers.
A common argument for the claim that Jane and Jane2 should be
taken to have mental states with the same content runs along
these lines: the subjects are functional duplicates, so they
will produce the same outputs (behaviour) when in the same
internal state and receiving the same inputs. But mental
states are invoked to explain behaviour; so Jane and Jane2
should be ascribed type-identical mental states to explain
their type-identical behaviour.
However, this argument begs the question by assuming that
the behaviour of the two is to be described in the same way.
It is far more plausible that according to Burge's
interpretation of his thought-experiment, Jane and Jane2
perform different actions as well as having different beliefs,
desires, and intentions. After all, his thought-experiment is
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supposed to tell us about the individuation of intentional
entities in general, including intentional actions. As a
member of our speech community, Jane can be described as
fearing that her arthritis has spread to her thigh, and as
going to the doctor with the intention of discovering whether
her fear is justified. Jane2, as a member of the other
community, does not have that fear, nor does she perform that
action. If the thought-experiment shows that beliefs are
individuated non-individualistically, it would also seem to
show that actions are individuated in the same way. Simply
stipulating that the behaviour of Jane and Jane2 is the same is
not sufficient to cast doubt on this obvious implication of the
thought-experiment.
The proponent of narrow content might now object that
there is no means by which the difference in the content of
Jane's and Jane2's mental states could produce different
actions. The argument here is that since the two are
physiologically and functionally the same, there is no physical
difference between them which could underwrite the difference
in the causes of their actions. But to say this is just to
reiterate the point that when thoughts and actions are
individuated in the way that Burge's case seems to show that
they are in common sense practice, they do not supervene on
individual constitution. Surely claims about the relationship
between the mental and the physical are constrained by what we
can discover about the nature of mental states. The fact that
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what the thought-experiment tells us renders individualistic
supervenience inadequate as a theory of that relationship does
not motivate the introduction of an individualistic notion of
content.
Fodor (1987:39) argues for the introduction of narrow
content along lines similar to those just described. He claims
that individuating psychological states with reference to
linguistic environment would be acceptable to science only if
there were a causal mechanism by which differences in
environment produced differences in the physiological states
assumed to realize psychological states. This requirement
clearly is not met in Burge's case, since the difference in
Jane's and Jane2's linguistic affiliation does not cause any
difference in their physiological states. But this argument
cannot motivate the introduction of individualistic
individuation as part of our common sense practice, since Fodor
is surely right in assuming that that the constraints on
individuation which rule out non-individualistic individuation
apply (if they apply at all) only to individuation in science.
In other words, cognitive psychology can perhaps be plausibly
held to be antecedently committed to individualistic
supervenience, but our common sense practice of action
explanation cannot.
2.2 Narrow Content and Point of View.
While the arguments discussed in the previous section sought to
motivate the ascription of shared thoughts on the basis of
physical and functional similarity, the present argument
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attempts to do so on the basis of phenomenological similarity.
In arguing that there is a sense in w :.ch Jane and Jane2 share
beliefs, it is often claimed that they have the same point of
view, or that they see the world in the same way. This line of
argument seems to inform these remarks of Blackburn's:
'On twin-earth there are people who love XYZ, who bathe a
lot, fish and own yachts, and wake up looking forward to a
day on the XYZ, or giving themselves kinaesthetic
pleasures imagining the soft cool XYZ trickling over their
bodies. Such a twin-earther is just like a water-loving
earthmen: in fact, if he were suddenly transported here he
would not notice the difference...Our psychologies are
det-rmined by the way we react to what we are aware of.
Since the features whereby we are aware of things are
universal (water...can look or sound or taste or appear
the same as other things of the same kind or ever.
different kinds, so are psychologies.' (Blackburn
1984:326).
Since Jane2 is simply Jane in a different environment
but withthe same phenomenological experiences, ex hypothesi
there is no difference she notices between the two linguistic
environments. Presumably, then, Jane and Jane2 are aware of
the same things and have the same thoughts (this is what
Blackburn means by having the same psychologies).
But this argument is too swift. It slides from a claim
about the phenomenological similarity of subjects' qualitative
experiences to a claim about the propositional content of their
beliefs. If what is being claimed is that Jane and Jane2
represent the world in the same way, then the slide would be
motivated; but then the premise cannot be assumed to be true
without begging the question against Burge's thought-
experiment. If the premise is that the experience of Jane and
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Jane2 is qualitatively identical, it is not controversial; but
then it is quite unclear how the conclusion about the
intentional contents of their thoughts is supposed to follow.
The argument does not establish that Jane and Jane2 are similar
in their representational rather than in their qualitative or
functional aspects.
2.3 A Different Approach to Individualistic Content.
What moral is to be drawn from our examination of these
arguments for the Ecumenical View? Both lines of argument
discussed above fail because they beg the question against the
view of propositional attitudes derived from Burge's thought-
experiment. Neither approach produces convincing evidence that
common sense practice involves individualistic individuation,
and the only reason given for introducing such a practice is
that doing so would make the Ecumenical View true. If these
defects are to be remedied, the claim that our everyday
practice of thought attribution has individualistic elements
must be independently motivated.
Recall that the aim of arguing that our common sense
practice has individualistic elements was to defend the
Continuity Thesis against the challenge presented by the
conclusion Burge draws from his thought-experiment. Let us
look a little more closely at how the thought-experiment is
supposed to challenge the Continuity Thesis. It seems that
common sense explanations of behaviour cannot be vindicated by
science if science and common sense individuate mental states
differently. But this conclusion follows from the thought-
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experiment only if the thought-experiment shows that the mental
states ascribed in giving common sense explanations of
behaviour are nonindividualistically individuated. If the
thought-experiment is to undermine the Continuity Thesis, it
must justify the claim that explanation in common sense invokes
states which are non-individualistically individuated. It has
been generally assumed that it does; but we need to ask whether
this assumption is warranted.
However, it may be objected that we have already made the
assumption that Jane and Jane2 perform different actions in
discussing the narrow content theorist's claim that their
behaviour is type-identical (Sec. 2.1). If two
individualistically identical agents perform different actions
in virtue of belonging to different linguistic communities, and
different explanations are required for those actions, then
common sense action explanations are non-individualistic. This
objection is misplaced; the point of the earlier discussion was
that we cannot simply stipulate that Jane and Jane2 perform the
same intentional actions in the face of Burge's purported
demonstration that they do not. But that is not our project
here. The appropriate method is not to stipulate, but to
investigate exactly when we do and when we do not individuate
thoughts and actions non-individualistically. We need to look
more closely at our everyday practice of belief ascription to
discover whether we individuate thoughts in a manner which is
sensitive to linguistic environment when giving common
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sense explanations of people's actions.
2.4 B-individuation.
Burge's thought-experiment presents a particular case in which
our attribution of belief contents is influenced by the
subject's linguistic environment. But how far can this result
be generalized? To answer this question, we must look more
closely at the aspects of our practice of belief individuation
emphasized by the thought-experiment. For convenience, I shall
call the mode of content individuation to which Burge draws
attention 'B-individuation.' What are the salient features of
B-individuation, and when and why do we B-individuate beliefs?
One of the most important features of the thought-
experiment is the fact that opaque belief ascriptions
containing the word 'arthritis' in the content clause can be
truly applied to Jane despite her misapprehension of the term's
3
extension. In ascribing beliefs to her we employ the words
she has uttered with their customary meaning; we do not
reinterpret them to capture her idiosyncratic understanding.
She is taken to have a grasp, imperfect though it may be, of
the concept of arthritis. Burge acknowledges that there are
some circumstances in which we do not accord a subject's words
their customary interpretation; the cases he mentions include
those in which the speaker is a child, a foreigner, a speaker
of a dialect, or the victim of a slip of the tongue. Here the
subject either does not have full command of our standards of
usage (child, foreigner), is not bound by them (dialect), or
has full command but fails to manifest it because of a
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performance error (slip of tongue). In each case the subject
is excused from being taken at his or her word; it is assumed
that the speakers did not say what they meant, or did not mean
what they said (except in the dialect case, where the subject
did not say what we thought he said). In the case of Jane, by
contrast, we accord her words their customary interpretation,
despite her misunderstanding, because she accepts that she said
and believed something false. The crucial point for the
thought-experiment is thus not, as Burge sometimes seems to
say, that she is prepared to defer to communal usage by
altering her use of 'arthritis'; the foreigner will do that
too, yet we do not take his words literally in ascribinG him
beliefs. It is that Jane is prepared to have her words
construed according to their socially accepted meaning, even
though this puts her in the wrong.
This partial list of cases in which we take subjects at
their word in attributing beliefs shows that there is still
much that is unclear about our practice of B-individuation.
How, for axample, do we decide when someone is a member of our
linguistic community? If Jane were prepared to alter her
linguistic usage (say, for purely pragmatic reasons) but not to
admit that her belief was false, should we still ascribe her
the belief that she has arthritis in her thigh? If we were
attempting a thorough account of B-individuation, we would need
to discover how radical a subject's misunderstanding can be
before B-individuation becomes inappropriate, how linguistic
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communities are differentiated and what the conditions for
membership of them are, and so on. But our aim here is merely
to get a rouch arasp of what B-individuation consists in, and
of when and why we do it, which will allow us to determine
whether this is the mode of belief individuation we employ when
qivinq common sense psychological explanations. It seems that
B-individuation consists in taking subjects to have the
attitudes expressed by their utterances, where these are
interpreted according to the standard usage of the linauistic
community to which the subject belongs. And thouqh it is far
from clear what constitutes the relevant sort of membership in
a linguistic community, as we have seen, the sorts of
difficulties that arise indicate something about what our
purposes are in B-individuatina.
When we B-individuate we hold people responsible for the
opinions their utterances express, even though they may not
fully understand the meaninas of the words they utter. The
difficulty raised above is that it is not yet clear whether we
hold people thus responsible even when they themselves maintain
that this involves a misconstrual of their claims. Presumably
our practice in such cases often depends on whether we see the
speaker's response as a disinqenuous attempt to avoid
criticism, or as a claim made in good faith. But the fact that
this is the sort of consideration that auides us suggests that
our interest in B-individuating is in intellectual
responsibility; our purpose is to determine which beliefs a
speaker is committed to defending in debate. If our interests
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in B-individuating have this specific focus, it would not be
surprising if we found that we individuate mental states
differently when our purpose is to explain a person's actions.
The sections which follow present some examples which
illustrate how we individuate beliefs when giving common sense
psychological explanations of action. I argued in the previous
section that the alternative mode of individuation here
illustrated, which I shall call E-individuation, is the one
which should command our attention if we are interested in
comparing the individuation of explanatory states in common
sense discourse and in cognitive pasychology. The examples show
that when we give common sense explanations of actions we may
attribute mental states which differ from those counselled by
B-individuation. We shall beqin with a case in which we B-
individuate one belief, but E-individuate two.
3 Some Cases of Incomplete Understandinq.
3.1 The Case of Paul.
Let us consider a thought-experiment inspired by an example
from Loar (1987). Suppose that Paul is an English speaker who
is misinformed about arthritis in just the same way as Jane;
and let us suppose that he says 'Arthritis is spreading from my
knees to my thigh.' Given this utterance, the principles of B-
individuation dictate that we should describe him as believino
that he has arthritis in his knees and in his thigh. He moves
to France and learns French, hearina of an ailment called
'arthrite' which, he learns, occurs only in joints. No-one
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tells him that 'arthrite' and 'arthritis' refer to the same
disease, and not surprisingly (in view of his original
misconception) this is not one of his beliefs. Then a French
doctor tells him (in French) that he has arthrtis in his knees,
and he believes her; he asserts 'J'ai arthrite aux qenoux.'
Paul is a competent French speaker who uses 'arthrite'
correctly, so the obvious way forus to report the belief he
thus asserts is
(2) Paul believes that he has arthritis in his knees.
As the principles of B-individuation dictate, we report the
belief Paul asserted, interpreting his words according to their
standard meaning.
The ascription (2) is thus counselled twice by the
practice of B-individuation; we apply it on the basis of Paul's
French assertion and on the basis of his English one. But
suppose that a French friend tells Paul of a miracle treatment
for arthritis, and that Paul applies the treatment to his knees
and believes it has succeeded. He will continue to search for
a cure for the other disease he believes still afflicts his
knees and thigh; if asked whether there is anything wrong with
his knees, he will still say that there is. How are we to
explain this behaviour? It seems to be intelliaible only on
the assumption that he has two different beliefs about what is
wrong with his knees, even though the unambiguous B-ascription
(2) fails to distinguish them. If we B-individuate beliefs, we
do not have the resources to explain Paul's behaviour; but
surely we can understand perfectly well why he behaves as he
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does .
On its most plausible interpretation, the story of Paul
shows that in giving common sense explanations of others'
actions we may need to individuate beliefs more finely than we
do when B-individuating. In explaining Paul's behaviour we
invoke two beliefs differing in content, even though B-
individuation delivers only one ascription to describe his
mental situation. How might a theorist who regards B-
individuation as adequate for common sense psychological
explanation--a person I shall describe as a Burgean--respond to
this example?
3.2 Burgean Responses Considered.
3.2.1 First Response.
A Buraean might simply deny that the univocal B-ascription is
inadequate to explain Paul's behaviour. But this is very
implausible; it means that Paul's failure to act as we would
expect given the belief ascribed to him by (2) can only be
explained irrationality or carelessness. We would have to say,
for example, that he continues to seek a cure for arthritis
because he has forgotten that he had applied the French
treatment. Intuitively this is not the cause of his behaviour,
and this move locates his problem in entirely the wrong place.
His failure to act as expected is due rather to lack of
information; he does not know that the disease called
'arthrite' and the disease called 'arthritis' are one and the
same. As a result of this, he does not draw the apparently
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obvious conclusion that there is only one thing wrong with his
knees.
3.2.2 Second Response.
The reply to the preceding objection suggests a different
response. The idea would be to maintain that Paul has just one
belief about what is wrong with his knees, as reported by (2),
and to attribute his unusual behaviour to his failure to
recognize that the words 'arthrite' and 'arthritis' have the
same meaning. Paul is ignorant of this metalinquistic truth;
but can this fact, in conjunction with the B-ascription (2), p
suffice to explain his actions? We are assuming that he acts
as follows: he applies the French miracle cure for arthritis to
his knees, and believes that it has succeeded, yet still
continues to search for a cure for the ailment he thinks
afflicts his knees and thigh. This train of events would most
naturally be explained by saying that Paul begins by believing
that he has two ailments in his knees, comes to believe that
one has been cured, and desires to find a cure for the one he
believes still remains. According to this account, his initial
and final mental states differ. According to the metalinguistic
Burgean response, however, Paul's assertions at the beginning
and end of the story support a single unambiguous B-ascription.
How can Paul's metalincuistic ignorance be used to remedy this?
The Burqean's most promising move appears to be to claim
that although Paul has a single belief, its contentebeing that
he has arthritis in his knees, his metalinguistic ibnorance
leads him to think that he has two beliefs differing in
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content. So he starts out thinking he has two beliefs and ends
up thinking he has one. This accommodates our intuition that
Paul's initial and final mental states are different; but does
it explain why he acts as he does? To explain this the Burqean
will have to say something along these lines: that Paul thinks
he has a belief he formulates as 'I have arthritis in my
knees,' he thinks he has a belief he formulates as 'J'ai
arthrite aux genoux', he thinks the two beliefs are different,
and he thinks the application of the cure gives him reason to
give up one but not the other.
But the Burgean who takes this line is effectively
conceding that the B-ascription (2) is inadequate to accounting
for Paul's behaviour, and is making all the distinctions among
psychological states that we are claiming are required for
psychological explanation. The difference between the taxonomy
of belief contents offered by B-individration and and the
taxonomy required for explaining actions is being recognized;
the distinctions are simply being made at the level of second-
order beliefs (beliefs about beliefs). But the claim that Paul
is acting out of beliefs about what he believes is very
implausible. There is no independent reason to suppose that
the beliefs Paul acts on are beliefs about what his beliefs
are, rather than ordinary object-level beliefs. In short, the
proposal is ad hoc.
3.2.3 Third Response.
A Burgean could deny that we would B-individuate beliefs as I
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have described, denying in particular that we would report the
belief Paul expresses in French using (2). But given the
principles of B-individuation described above, this seems
implausible. A competent French speaker who says 'J'ai
arthrite aux genoux' surely expresses the belief that he or she
has arthritis in the knees, and Paul is a competent French
speaker.who understands the word 'arthrite' perfectly. It
would be more plausible to claim that (2) is not a correct
report of the belief Paul acquired in England, in view of his
misunderstanding of the English word. But to claim this is to
abandon the fundamental principle of B-individuation--the
principle that speakers' words are to be interpreted according
to their standard use, and not according to how they understand
them, when giving belief reports.
3.3 Conclusions from the Case of Paul.
The implausibility of these attempts to reinterpret the example
of Paul shows that we have here a strong case for the claim that
E-individuation--the individuation of thoughts required by
common sense psychological explanation--sometimes compels us to
discriminate belief contents more finely than does B-
individuation. In the next section I shall argue that the
converse is also true; that is, that the demands of
psychological explanation sometimes lead us to discriminate
belief contents more coarsely than they are picked out by B-
individuation.
3.4 The Case of Alfred.
The example I shall use is a variant of one employed by Burqe
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in an earlier paper in which he himself draws attention to two
sets of intuitions about how beliefs should be individuated.
Burge (1978) introduces Alfred, who misunderstands the word
'fortnight', applying it to periods of ten rather than fourteen
days. Alfred also believes that Bertrand will be qone for ten
days; we may suppose that Bertrand has told him this, and that
Alfred believes him. Alfred now utters the words 'Bertrand
will be gone for a fortnight.' It is plausible that Alfred
thereby asserts that Bertrand will be gone for a fortnight; he
is a competent speaker of English bound by its conventions.
But does he believe that Bertrand will be gone for a fortnight?
The principles of B-individuation would of course dictate
that Alfred does have this belief, since that is what he
asserted. Indeed, Burge reports that many people, 'desiring to
maintain a close relation between sincere assertion and
belief', hold that the following is true:
(3) Alfred believes that Bertrand will be gone for a
fortnight.
These informants were evidently attributing beliefs according
to the principles of B-individuation. However, Burge also
notes that there is a widespread intuition that Alfred does not
believe that Bertrand will be gone for a fortnight, despite the
fact that this is what he asserted. Holders of this view
maintain that Alfred holds only the belief given by
(4) Alfred believes that Bertrand will be gone for ten days
and not that given by (3). The attractions of this view are
obvious if we are interested in explaining Alfred's actions.
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Let us suppose that Alfred has to meet Bertrand's train; we
have no hesitation in predicting that he will go to the station
in ten rather than fourteen days' time, his reason being that
he believes that Bertrand will return in ten days. By
contrast, describing Alfred as believing that Bertrand will
return in a fortnight does nothing to explain why he goes to
the station after ten days have passed. As Burge remarks,
'defenders of this view...tend to mention the fact that Alfred
had in mind a period of ten days...Alfred's actions will be
largely based on his belief that Bertrand will be gone for ten
days. His linguistic mistake is irrelevant for such purposes
as meeting the train' (1978:133). Holders of this view were
evidently E-individuating, attributing beliefs with an eye to
common sense psychological explanation.
As before we must deal with objections from the Burgean,
who in this case will want to deny that the demands of common
sense psychological explanation lead to the rejection of (3).
But if the Burgean adheres to Burge's procedure, which is to
attempt to accommodate as much as possible of our ordinary
practice, the intuitions of the many speakers who withhold (3)
because of its irrelevance to explaining Alfred's actions must
be respected. However, the Burgean may attempt to argue that
the practice of these speakers is inconsistent. The strategy
here would be to take advantage of Burse's claim that both
those who affirm and those who reject (3) agree that
(5) Alfred believes that a fortnight is ten days.
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If proponents of E-individuation accept (4) and (5), it seems
that they can hardly deny (3); for if Alfred believes that
Bertrand will be gone for ten days, and that a fortnight is ten
days, he is likely to conclude that Bertrand will be gone for a
fortnight. Indeed, it seems that we will want to hypothesize
just such a train of reasoning to explain why Alfred says
'Bertrand will be gone for a fortnight.'' Consistency thus
forces proponents of E-individuation to accept (3) if they
affirm (5).
The weak point in this argument is the premise that
proponents of E-individuation are committed to accepting (5).
It is true that one might well explain Alfred's utterance by
saying 'He believes that a fortnight is ten days'; but we are
equally likely to say something like 'He says 'fortnight' when
he mearns ten days.' In everyday discourse people are generally
lax about the distinction between using and mentioning a word,
so it is not surprisinq that they should be indifferent between
those fornulations which portray Alfred's mistake at the object
level (as does (5)) and those which portray it as
metalinguistic. Given the laxity of everyday speech, it does
not seems that there is any great obstacle to regarding (5) as
a loose rendering of
(6) Alfred believes that 'fortnight' means ten days.
This analysis affords us a way of accommodating a curious
feature of E-individuative practice which is revealed by
Alfred's case. Burge notes that 'on the negative [i.e. E-
individuative] view, we withhold attribution of belief with
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terms...misunderstood by the believer, except in attributions
like [(5)] which are the natural means of identifying his
mistake' (1978:134). On the present account, the attribution
in question should be interpreted as crediting the speaker with
a belief about a word (i.e. (6)), not with the concept the word
expresses. Alfred's utterance is easily explained by citing
(4) and (6); since Alfred believes that Bertrand will be gone
for ten days, and that 'fortnight' means ten days, he will
think that one way to convey his belief is to say 'Bertrand
will be gone for a fortnight.'
Here, though, the Burgean might complain that our
metalinguistic rendering of (5) is 'an ad hoc piece of special
pleading, undermined by the evidence we actually use for
deciding whether a thought was metalinguistic' (Burge 1919:97).
The claim here is that when presented with our account,
involving (4) and (6), of the reasoning leading to his
utterance, Alfred may protest that his reasoning did not fix
upon words (ibid.). But given that on any reasonable common
sense theory metalinguistic beliefs must surely be implicated
in the production of utterances, whether we are aware of them
or not, we have an independent reason not t. accord much weight
to Alfred's response in this case.
The conclusion we have reached, then, is that a consistent
explanation of Alfred's verbal and nonverbal actions can be
given if we hold (4) and (6) rather than (3) and (5).
Furthermore, this is the preferred method of attributing
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beliefs to Alfred to explain his actions; so the claim that one
can also give a consistent explanation involving (3) and (5)
is, though true, not really relevant. The question is how
people do individuate attitudes when giving psychological
explanations, not how *hey might consistently do so. The case
of Alfred indicates that when explaining actions (i.e. when E-
individuating), we may prefer belief ascriptions which capture
subjects' idiosyncratic concentions to ascriptions which credit
subjects with the concepts standardly expressed by their words.
But we have yet to show that E-individuation is coarser than B-
individuation; for that we need a case in which we B-
individuate two beliefs but B-individuate one.
3.5 A Thought-Experiment.
Let us imagine a counterfactual case in which Alfred remains
exactly as before, insofar as he is nonintentionally described,
but where he is member of a linguistic community in which the
word-form 'fortnight' is standardly used to refer to a period
of ten days. In other words, the counterfactual condition
differs only in that correct use is the same as Alfred's actual
misuse. Let us call Alfred in this condition 'Alfred2.'
Alfred2, like Alfred, is told that Bertrand will be qone ten
days, utters the word-forms 'Bertrand will be gone for a
fortnight', and goes to the station after ten days have
elapsed. We may agree with Burge that Alfred2 did not assert
that Bertrand would be gone for a fortnight; since he belongs
to a different linguistic community, we cannot interpret his
words according to the meanings they would have in our dialect.
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But let us concentrate on Alfred2's action of going to the
station. What is his reason for doing this? The most natural
way for us to explain his action is to say that he wants to
meet Bertrand and believes that he can do so by going to the
station after ten days; that is, Alfred2 believes that Bertrand
will be gone for ten days. Thus we give the same explanation
for the actions of Alfred and Alfred2 despite the difference in
their linguistic environments.
In the case of Alfred2, attribution of beliefs by content
expressed--B-individuation--will lead us to withhold the
ascription 'Alfred2 believes that Bertrand will be gone for a
fortnight' and will permit 'Alfred2 believes that Bertrand will
be gone for ten days.' So in this case, B-individuation and E-
individuation will counsel the same belief attributions. But
this does not cast doubt on the the reality of E-individuation.
There are other cases, as we have seen, where the two
individuative schemes yield different ascriptions; and
furthermore, we can see why the two schemes, elsewhere
divergent, would coincide in the case of Alfred2. They
coincide because his usage of the word 'fo,'tnight' matches its
standard usage in his linguistic community. In fact, B-
individuation and E-individuation will diverge only when
agents' unexpected behaviour reveals that their grasp of
communal concepts is imperfect, forcing us to differentiate
between the actual meaning of the words they use and the
meaning they attach to them. In the majority of cases, agents'
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use of terms is close enough to standard use for B- and E-
ascriptions to coincide.
3.6 E-individuation and Expressibility.
It is one thing to show (as do the cases discussed above) that
when we are giving common sense psychological explanations, we
may not individuate beliefs according to the non-
individualistic scheme we have been calling B-individuation; it
is another to show that the individuative scheme we employ when
picking out explanatory states can properly be called
'individualistic.' But our discussion of these cases provides
good reasons to believe that E-individuation can be so
described. When we E-individuate belief contents we are
concerned not with the standard use of the words the subject
utters, but with the way the subject uses them; we want to know
the meaning the individual attaches to them, not the meaning
the community gives them. Thus the same E-ascriptions can be
true of individuals who use a symbol in the same way, even
though they belong to linguistic communities in which that
symbol is used differently (cf. Alfred and Alfred2); and where
a subject uses two symbols differently, two beliefs will be E-
individuated even though the symbols in question may be used in
the same way in the two linguistic communities to which the
subject belongs (cf. Paul). It is the way the individual uses
a symbol, not the way the community uses it, that is important
4
for E-individuation. Beliefs thus individuated supervene on
features of the individual taken in isolation, rather than
depending on norms in the communities to which they belong.
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When we individuate thoughts individualistically, we may
withhold that-clauses containing words the subject uses or
understands in a nonstandard way, and instead employ terms
whose standard meaning captures the meaninq the subject
attaches to the misunderstood word. Thus we use 'ten days' but
nof: 'fortnight' in describing Alfred's beliefs
individualistically. It follows that individualistic content
is at least sometimes expressible; that is, that we can at
least sometimes pick out individualistic beliefs by producinq
opaque that-clauses which directly display their content, as we
5
do in the cases of Alfred and Alfred2. In the case of Paul
this is not so easy, as there is no readily available
expression in English which captures the notion Paul first
acquires (the notion of a rheumatoid disease which can occur in
both bones and joints). But we can construct a case which is
parallel to Paul's in that we E-individuate two beliefs and B-
individuate one, but differs in that the contents of the two E-
beliefs are expressible.
Let us suppose that Mary is an Enalish speaker who
mislearns the word 'fortnight' in America, applying it to
periods of ten days. She then moves to France and learns
French, acquiring the word 'quinzaine' which she correctly
applies to fortnights. In America she read in an encyclopaedia
the sentence 'The period of the third moon of Saturn is a
fortnight,' and believed it; now she reads in a French
encyclopaedia that the period of the same moon is "une
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quinzaine." She is puzzled and wonders which book is right.
How are we to explain this sequence of events? It seems
obvious that Mary entertains two thoughts about the period of
this 'moon; she believes (at least tentatively) that it lasts a
fortnight and she believes that it lasts ten days. She knows
that these thoughts cannot both be true, because they differ in
content; so she wants to find out which is correct. Thus we E-
individuate two attitudes:
(7) Mary wonders whether the period of the third moon of
Saturn is ten days,
and
(8) Mary wonders whether the period of the third moon of
Saturn is a fortnight.
By contrast, the principles of B-individuation would lead us to
hold that (8) alone is true and (7) false. The two sentences
Mary reads have the same socially accepted meaning; both
sentences state that the period of the third moon of Saturn is
a fortnight, and neither concerns periods of ten days. A
competent French speaker who reads and speculates on the truth
of the statement in the French encyclopaedia would naturally be
described as wondering whether the period in question is a
fortnight; and when we are B-individuating Mary's beliefs, we
use ascriptions with 'fortnight' in the content clause despite
her misunderstanding of the word. But (8) alone does not
provide a satisfactory explanation of Mary's puzzlement; if she
acquired the same thought from each encyclopaedia, why does she
wonder which one is right?
The case of Mary differs from that of Paul in that there
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is a readily available expression (namely, 'ten days') which
captures Mary's idiosyncratic understanding of the word she
misuses, while there is no such readily available expression to
characterize Paul's misconception. But what does 'readily
available' mean here? It is extremely unlikely that a
rational, competent speaker of English (as we are imagining
Mary to be) would not be familiar with the words 'ten' and
'days'; and it is equally unlikely, given th. frequency with
which they are used, that she would misapply or misunderstand
them. Our willingness to use 'ten days' to express the
contents of her E-beliefs surely owes much to the fact that the
expression is almost certainly one she uses, and one she uses
correctly. Moreover, we have good reason to believe that it
accurately captures the notion Mary has in mind, since she
applies the word 'fortnight' exclusively to periods of ten
days. By contrast, it is quite possible that Paul would not be
familiar with expressions which are candidates for capturing
his misconception; he may not know, for instance, what
'rheumatoid condition' means. We are also less confident, in
his case, that our candidate expressions accurately capture his
concept.
What does the comparison of the cases of Mary and Paul
tell us about the constraints on the expressibility of E-
individuated or individualistic contents? It is important to
note that the cases illuminate only a restricted aspect of our
practice; in each case we are concerned with the expressibility
78
of E-beliefs in English, and part of the evidence (in addition
to nonverbal behaviour) for the attributions comes from English
sentences read or uttered by the subject. The cases can thus
only tell us about the expressibility in a language L of
beliefs acquired from statements in L or attributed (at least
partly) on the basis of utterances in L. The constraint seems
to be that an E-belief is expressible in L under the conditions
stated just in case the expressions of L used in the content
clause of the E-ascription capture the subject's concept and
are likely to be used and understood by the subject.
This rule is rough and imprecise, but if it provides at
least a partial description of our ascriptive practice, it
shows that there are limits to the expressibility of
individualistic thought contents. But the fact that we can
sometimes express the contents of such thoughts shows that it
is not in principle impossible to capture a person's
individualistic notions, even though it may on occasion be
difficult to determine which of several related notions a
person employs, or to know which expressions are available (in
the sense discussed above) for characterizing them. The point
to be stressed is that the contents of individualistic thoughts
do not seem to be essentially inexpressible, as some have
maintained. Whether or not they are expressible depends on
accidental facts, such as the expressive resources of the
ascriber's language and the likelihood of finding a paraphrase
couched in trms with which the subject will be familiar.
Since the expressibility of individualistic contents does
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depend on extraneous considerations, the fact that sometimes
the contents of subjects' individualistic thoughts are
inexpressible is surely not good grounds for denying that they
have such thoughts.
4 Explanatory States in Common Sense and Cognitive Psychology.
4.1 Conclusions.
Let us sum up the conclusions reached thus far. I have argued
that the cases of Paul, Alfred and Mary support four claims.
These are:
(a) When we are giving common sense psychological explanations
in terms of mental states with propositional content, our
individuative practice may differ from the non-individualistic
practice exemplified by Burge's thought-experiment.
(b) The mode of thought individuation we there employ can be
called individualistic, in that it varies not with communal
norms but with individual use.
(c) Where individual and communally accepted use coincide, the
two modes of individuation pick out the same thoughts.
(d) The contents of individualistically individuated thoughts
are sometimes expressible, and their expressibility depends on
extraneous (i.e. non-psychological) features of the subject's
situation.
The question we must now ask is: what are the implications
of these results for the issues discussed in the Introduction?
Recall that one of our motivations for examining content
individuation in common sense contexts was to assess the status
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of the Continuity Thesis. This is the view that the
explanatory states invoked by cognitive psychology share
important properties of the attitudes attributed in
explanations in common sense. Burge's claim that propositional
attitudes are individuated with reference to linguistic
environment, taken together with the widespread view that the
explanatory states of cognitive psychology are not individuated
in this way, appeared to cast doubt on the Thesis. But it is
the individuation of explanatory states that is relevant to the
truth of the Continuity Thesis, and, as claims (a) and (b)
show, these are individuated individualistically. The examples
discussed in this paper indicate that Burge's thought-
experiment is not representative of how we attribute thoughts
when giving common sense psychological explanations. The
challenge supposedly presented to the Continuity Thesis by
Burge's thought-experiment is rebuffed.
4.2 The Ecumenical View.
What, then, of the two reactions to Burge's challenge, the
Schismatic View and the Ecumenical View? Proponents of the
first of these hold that cognitive psychology individuates
psychological states individualistically states while common
sense discourse attributes non-individualistic mental states.
Holders of the Ecumenical View maintain that rather than being
purely non-individualistic, as Burge implies, content
individuation in common sense discourse also has
individualistic elements. Insofar as adoption of the Schismatic
View is motivated by Burge's claim that propositional attitudes*
81
are non-individualistically individuated, that motivation is
removed by (a) and (b), which show that such individuation is
not universal in common sense.
The Ecumenical View seems to provide a more accurate
depiction of common sense practice. The picture we glean from
the examples is that our common sense practice of attitude
ascription is complex; we individuate thoughts in one way when
explaining others' actions, in another when identifying the
opinions they are committed to defending. In the context of
explanation we attempt to capture as closely as possible the
meaning individuals attach to the terms they use, even though,
as (d) indicates, this this may be difficult to express. In
the context of debate, we hold them to the socially accepted
meaning of their words, even though they themselves may
misunderstand the words they use. Of course, as claim (c)
above indicates, the two modes of individuation may (and
perhaps frequently do) converge on the same ascription. In
this case the attitude which is causally explaiatory of action
and the attitude which is the object of intellectual criticism
have the same content.
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Footnotes.
[1] The content of a mental state or event is given by the
that-clause of the ascription used to attribute the state or
event to a thinker. For our purposes we may, like Burge,
remain neutral as to precisely what contents are; our interest
is in patterns of propositional attitude attribution.
[2] The relevant passage is this: 'if we leave the communal
environment...out of consideration, with a view to focusing on
the topic of intra-individual psychology, then our picture will
contain nothing at all that is recognizable as a subject of
mental states. That casts suspicion on the label 'intra-
individual psychology'; for there will be no obvious reason in
that case to accept that the findings of such a discipline
would have any constitutive relevance to the mind' (Pettit &
McDowell 1986:14). Since cognitive psychology does ignore the
communal environment in individuating the content of
psychological states, it can presumably only offer an 'intra-
individual. psychology' without relevance to the mental. The
aim here is to challenge the claim that common sense
psychological explanations require vindication by scientific
psychology.
[31 Strictly speaking, it is not the belief ascription itself
which is opaque or transparent, but the belief construction as
it occurs in a particular context. For convenience, I will
speak of a belief ascription's being 'opaque' when terms in the
that-clause are not open to substitution by coreferential
expressions salva veritate.
[43 I should stress that these remarks are not intended to
imply that meaning reduces to use, or that use is responsible
for meaning. The claim is that the cases discussed earlier
indicate that when individuating beliefs with an eye to action
explanation, we treat subjects' use of words as important
indicators of the content of their beliefs. It is one thing to
say that use provides evidence for content, another to say that
use determines content.
[5] The notion of expressibility at work here, common though
it is in current literature, is not easy to capture briefly.
We must distinguish between expressing a thought content and
describing it. As a rule, a singular term of the form 'X's
belief that p' describes X's belief rather than expressing it
if replacing 'that' by 'which' produces a meaningful
expression. Thus 'Paul's belief that [which] he would express
in English with 'Arthritis is painful"'' picks out a belief by
describing it, while 'Paul's belief that [which*] snow is
white' picks out a belief by expressing it.
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Individualism and Semantic Development.
1. Introduction.
In the last few years Tyler Burqe has published a series of
papers in which he argues that the content of a person's
intentional mental states (such as thoughts, beliefs, and
desires) is partially determined by features of that person's
physical and social tnvironment (Burqe 1979, 1982a, 1982b,
1986b, 1986c). In a recenrt paper (Burge 1986a) he advances the
same claim about the content of the representational states
attributed in scientific psychology. The aim of this paper,
like that of his earlier work, is to argue against the view he
calls 'individualism.' This is the view that, as Burge puts it,
'the mental natures of all of a person's...mental states (or
events) are such that there is no necessary or deep
individuative relation between the individual's being in states
of those kinds and the individual's physical or social
evironments' (1986a;4). Birge claims that 'individualism is
arima facie wrong about psychology, including cognitive
psychology' (1986a:9). Ir his view, tnere is a "necessary or
deep" indivinuat-ve relation between the intentional statt.
attributed in psychology and the environment of the person to
whom they are ascribed. His thought-experiment illustrates the
individuetive relation which he believes to hold between ment"
states and social environment; he interprets it as showing that
'propositional attitudes...depend for their content on
social factors that are independent of the
individual...For if the social environment had been
C5
appropriately different, the content of those attitudes
would have been different' (1979:85).
According to this view, a person's being in a certain
psychological state (a psychological state with a certain
content) necessarily involves her occupying a certain kind of
social environment; had she been the same in all non-
intentional respects, but occupied an environment that was
appropriately different, she would not have been in that
psychological state.
Ostensibly Burge's target is "pan-individualism", the view
that all of psychology is individualistic (i.e. attributes
mental states which are individualistically individuated). He
writes that 'in questioning the view that psychology is
individualistic I am not thereby doubting whether there are
some subparts of psychology that conform to the strictures of
individualism' (1986a:10). Despite this guarded formulation,
however, the burden of Burge's paper is that no part of
psychology in which content is ascribed to psychological states
is individualistic (1986a:9). He makes it clear that those
subparts of psychology which may be individualistic are those
which employ a "formalistic" level of description intermediate
between the attitudinal and the physiological (1986a:22-3). In
his view, where the level of description is intentional,
psychological states are individuated with respect to the
subject's environment.
The claim of this paper is that Burge's "pan-anti-
individualist" view of content in psychology is wrong, I ao
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not intend to take issue with Burge's interpretation of Marr's
theory of vision, in which he argues that the content of the
perceptual states attributed in the theory depends on the
perceiver's physical environment.. My concern will be with
Burge's claim that there is a necessary or deep individuative
relation between psychological states and social environment.
I shall describe a psychological research project in which the
attribution of intentional states plays a central role, and
present a thought-experiment which shows that the theory
attributes intentional states which are not individuatad with
respect to social environment. Contrary to the pan-anti-
individualist view, content individuation in this part of
cognitive psychology is predominantly individualistic.
Burge holds that 'individualism as applied to psychology
must be revisionistic' (1986a:9). He writes:
'I have not tried to argue for non-individualistic
psychological theories from a standpoint outside of
psychology. The heart of my case is the observation
that psychological theories, taken literally, are not
purely individualistic, that there are no strong reasons
for taking them non-literally, and that we currently
have no superior standpoint for judging how psychology
ought to be done than that of seeing how it is done'
(1986:24).
I agree that the appropriate method for judging whether
psychology is individualistic is to look at how it is done.
The heart of my case is the observation that when we do look at
how psychologists explain semantic development, we find that
their approach is individualistic. There is no need to resort
to revision, supplementation, or special pleading to support
the individualistic individuation of psychological states; it
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already occurs in an important part of psychology.
2. Semantic Development.
2.1 Over- and Under-Extensions.
There are three aspects of psychological research on semantic
development which make it a suitable area in which to assess
Burge's claims about content individuation in psychology. The
first is that modelling the acquisition of semantic knowledge
clearly involves attributing states with representational or
intentional properties. It is, after all, the development of
an intentional state that is being studied. Since the level of
description of psychological states is intentional, Burge
cannot dismiss evidence of individualistic individuation in
semantic development on the grounds that the theory describes
states at a "formalistic" or sub-intentional level.
The second notable aspect of work on semantic development
is that it has a feature which Burge regards as indicative of
non-individualistic psychological theories; it is 'not success-
neutral,' as Burge puts it (1986a:30). What he means by this
is that the theory 'attribute[s] states that are subject to
practical...evaluation by reference to standards partly set by
a wider environment' (1986a:25). Theories of semantic
development attempt to explain how children succeed in learning
the meanings words have in the surrounding linguistic
community; on Burge's analysis they aim to explain the success
of the process of semantic acquisition, where the standards of
success are set by the linguistic environment, If linguistic
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environment plays a role in determining the content of mental
representations, we would expect that role to be evident in the
study of the development of children's knowledge of word
meanings. Not surprisingly, Burge himself predicts that
thought-experiments purporting to show that mental contents are
individuated with reference to linguistic environment 'would be
more relevant to social and developmental psvcholoqy, to
concept learning, and to parts of "higher" cognitive
psychology' (1986a:26; emphiasis added).
The third point which makes semantic development an apt
testing ground for Burge's anti-individualist views is that the
literature on semantic acquisition contains many examples of
the phenomena of over- and under-extension, examples which
directly parallel the cases of misuse exploited in Burge's
thought-experiments. Children at various stages of development
frequently apply a word to a category of objects which is
either more inclusive or more restricted than the category to
which the word is standardly applied. If the word is used too
restrictedly, the child is said to underextend it; if the use
is too inclusive, the word is overextended. There is an
obvious similarity to the cases Burge uses to generate his
thought-experiments--cases in which speakers overextend
'arthritis' or 'sofa,' or underextend 'contract' or 'brisket'
Considering how developmental psychologists treat this
phenomenon provides a test of whether or not they attribute
concepts with reference to linguistic practices in the child's
community, as Burge's interpretation of his thought-experiment
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(and his pan-anti-individualism) would predict.
The theoretical treatment of semantic development is not
yet as highly developed as the theory of vision which Burge
describes in 'Individualism and Psychology.' Current
hypotheses are still at the stage of modelling the changes
which occur in children's representations of word meanings as
their knowledge develops. As yet there is no consensus on the
course of these changes, and there are no detailed proposals
about the computational mechanisms responsible for them. But
the competing models of development are set within the same
theoretical framework--a framework which, I shall argue,
motivates an individualistic treatment of under- and over-
extensions. In the next section I will sketch the shared
theoretical aims and assumptions of current models of semantic
development.
2.2 Models of Semantic Development.
Current models of the development of knowledge of word meanirgs
are set within the framework of a representational theory of
mind: a child's attaching meaning M to some word w is conceived
of as the child's having an entry for w in his or her mental
lexicon which represents the meaning as M. The aim of a theory
of semantic development is to explain how the child constructs
such lexical entries for words on the basis of her mental
representations of the linguistic and nonlinguistic contexts in
which she hears them (Carey 1982:347).
To achieve this aim the theorist must describe the general
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form that lexical entries take, the sequence of changes they go
through during development, and the mechanisms responsible for
their undergoing that sequence. As mentioned above, current
models are directed mainly to the first two tasks. These
models ccnceive of representations of word meanings as being
composed of semantic features which specify criteria of
application for the word in question. Classical models, such
as Clark's Semantic Features Hypothesis, assume that the list
of features composing a lexical entry provide necessary and
sufficient conditions of application; an object must have all
and only the features specified by the list if the word is to
be correctly applied to it. Recent Prototype models (such as
Bowerman's 1978, 1980) assume tnat the object need only have
some subset of the features listed for the word to be
applicable. There may be no one feature which it is necessary
that all refereuits share, though the features may be weighted
so that possession of some features--those exhibited by the
"best exemplar" or prototypical referent--may be more important
than possession of others (Bowerman,, 1978:280).
Within each category of models, there are disagreements
over whether the features of which early lexical entries are
composed are predominantly perceptual or functional, and over
whether the features composing early lexical entries are the
same as those found in the adult's lexicon. There are also
differences over whether lexical entries develop from the
general to the specific (as in Clark's hypothesis) or from the
specific to the general (as iu Bowerman's hypothesis).
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According to the "general to specific" view, the child's early
lexical entry for a word typically consists of a subset of the
features which compose the adult entry for the same word.
Early words will therefore tend to be overextended, since their
lexical entries will underspecify the category of objects to
which the word applies. Clark gives the following example:
'suppose that the child has learned the word dog;
however, he only uses one feature to characterize the
mearling of this word, so the set of objects that he will
put into the category named dog will be larger than the
set in the adult category. For instance, he might have
characterized the word doqg as meaning four-legged; the
sets of objects referred to as dog, therefore, might
include cows, sheep, zebras, llamas, [and] dogs...'
(1973:193).
On this view, the dominant process in semantic development is
that of adding more specific features to lexical entries, which
has the effect of narrowing the categories of objects to which
words are applied.
According to the "specific to general" view, early words
are initially associated with a detailed representation
(typically constructed from features) of an object to which the
child has heard the word applied. Early words will therefore
tend to be underextended, since they will be applied only to
objects which match the specified referent. Bloom (1973:72)
describes an example of such usage; her daughter used 'car'
only for moving cars seen from her window, not applying the
word to stationary cars, cars that she was in, or pictures of
cars. On this view, semantic development involves a process of
generalization; the child gradually abstracts some features
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from the detailed representation and reorganizes the lexical
entry to give these greater weight in the application of the
word (Bowerman 1978:281). Words which were initially
underextended will later be correctly extended or overextended.
This brief sketch of current approaches to modelling
semantic development is oversimplified and incomplete. But it
does illustrate the crucial importance of evidence of over- and
under-extension in choosing between different models. All the
models view lexical entries as actively constructed by the
child out of semantic features, and discovering the ways in
which children over- and under-extend words can provide vital
insight into the process of coiistruction.
The experimental investigation of Clark's Semantic
Features Hypothesis provides an example of the importance of
over- and under-extensions as evidence and of the methods used
to test for their presence. Clark originally advanced her
hypothesis on the basis of evidence of widespread
overextensions in young children's spontaneous utterances and
in their comprehension of speech (1979:199-221). She proposed
that
'when the child first begins to use identifiable
words...he has only partial entries for them in his
lexicon, such that these partial entries correspond in
some way to some of the features or components of
meaning that would be present in the entries for the
same words in the adult's lexicon...The principal
difference between child and adult. categories at this
stage will be that the child's are generally larger
since he will use only one or two features criterially
instead of a whole combination of features.' (Clark
1973:193).
Clark, then, adopts a Classical view of concepts and a "general
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to specific" view of semantic development. She predicts both
that children will overextend words at first because they will
initially construct incomplete lexical entries, and that pairs
of words which are not synonyms will often be synonymous for
the child. This comes about because the partial meaning the
child constructs for word A may correspond to the complete
meaning constructed for word B. For instance, children
commonly overextend 'brother,' taking it to be synonymous with
'boy'; the meaning attached to both words is the same, namely
[+ Male] [- Adult] (Clark 1973:218-20).
Clark also makes specific claims about the features which
compose the adult meanings of words, and the order in which
children acquire those features. She proposes that the
features which comprise the adult representations of word
meanings are hierarchically ordered from the general to the
specific, and predicts that children acquire the more general
features first (1973:196). For example, she proposes that the
meaning of 'big' is represented as [Adj] [comparative] [+
Dimension (3)] [+ Polar], where the features are presented in
order of increasing specificity. The meaning of 'tall' is
given by the same feature list, with the addition of the more
specific feature [+ Vertical], which indicates the dimension of
comparison. If children acquire general features before
specific ones, they will first acquire the features which the
two words have in common; only later will they acquire the
feature which shows that 'big' and 'tall' are not synonymous
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(1973:212).
As this example suggests, the domain of comparative
spatial adjectives provides a good testing ground for the
Semantic Featuces Hypothesis. Clark drew on evidence that
children go through a stag. at which they overextend 'tall' and
'short,' understanding them as meaning the same as 'big' and
'little' respectively. Evidence offered to support this claim
includes the fact that children offer 'little' as the opposite
of 'tall,' and indicate either the shortest or the thinnest
object in an array when asked to choose the shortest one.
Clark hypothesized that the child's lexical entries for 'tall'
and 'big' were the same, both consisting of the features [+
Dimension (3)] and [+ Polar], as predicted by her theory; the
entry for 'tall' did not yet specify the dimension of
comparison as being vertical (Clark 1973:212).
However, Carey (1978) showed that when individual
children's pattern of responses was studied across different
tasks, evidence for a synonymy between 'tall' and 'big' was
lacking, Children did make errors suggesting that they did not
yet understand 'tall' correctly, but the pattern of errors
made by each child indicated that the lexical entry for the
word was always more complex than just [+ Dimension (3)] H+
Pole] (Carey 1978:285-6). Carey suggests that the child's
early representations of dimensional adjectives are restricted
to particular uses, in that they contain information about
particular objects to which the word is applicable (1978:286).
She agrees with Clark that children's lexical entries for these
9;
words do not contain the feature which specifies the dimension
of comparison to which the adjective applies (e.g. [vertical]
for 'tall' and 'high,' [horizontal] for 'wide' and 'fat'); but
she proposes that they contain information about which
variation of which kinds of objects the adjective applies to.
Thus a child might know that 'tall' used of people 'picks out
bigness along the axis from head to toe' and yet not know how
to apply the word to other kinds of objects (Carey 1982:371).
This series of results illustrates two points about how
representations of word meanings are attributed in the study of
semantic development. The first point is that children are
described as attaching idiosyncratic meanings to words,
meanings which differ from those standardly attached to the
word in question. As the experiments outlined above testify,
discovering individual children's lexical entries for
particular words can provide a crucial test for hypotheses
about the principles underlying the construction of word
meanings.
The second point is that psychologists specify lexical
entries in terms of the semantic features out of which the
child is believed to have constructed them. They are not
specified in terms of how they deviate from the meanings the
words in question have in the surroundinc community.
3. A Thought-Experiment.
With this brief sketch of the developmental psychologist's
methods and assumptions in mind, let us consider a case
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analogous to Burge's thought-experiment. Suppose that Amy is a
four year-old child brought up in an English-speaking
community, and suppose further that she participates in a study
of spatial adjectives. In the course of the study she is asked
questions to map her understanding of various words. The
experimental protocol is designed to probe for lexical entries
containing information about the dimensions of particular
objects, of the type hypothesized by Carey (1978).
Amy, like many other children of her age, uses the word
'tall' slightly differently from adults. Records of her
spontaneous utterances show that she applies the word only to
tall people, not to other tall objects that she sees around
her. When shown a picture of a tall man or of a short man and
asked, 'Is this a tall man?' she answers correctly. She also
chooses the tallest woman from a pictured array differing only
in height when asked, 'Is one taller than the others, or are
they all the same in tallness?'. She is not distracted by
variation in other dimensions when the stimuli are pictures of
people. Confronted with a pictured series of men of equal
height but differing girth, she says that they are all the same
in tallness; and she responds correctly when asked to pick the
tallest person from a group of people differing in both height
and fatness. But when shown pictures of tall buildings and
tall trees and asked 'Is this a tall building?' or 'Is this a
tall tree?' she answers, 'No, a big one' (cf. Carey 1978:288).
What are we to say about the meaning Amy attaches to
'tall'? If we describe the situation in the way that RurgP
A"
describes his original thought-experiment, the question at
issue is whether Amy's mastery of 'tall' is close enough to
standard use for her to be attributed a grasp, imperfect though
it is, of the communally established concept of tallness (or,
as I shall put it, the concept tall). Indeed, psychologists
sometimes seem to be concerned with this question, saying that
tests like those given to Amy are a way of investigating the
child's concept of tall, and thereby apparently implying that
the child has this concept. However, what is usually claimed
is that the child's concept of tall differs from the adult's
concept, which is hardly consistent with the view that talk
about the child's concept of tall is to be interpreted as
showing that the child is being attributed the adult or
communal concept. What seems to be meant by saying that these
studies reveal the child's concept of tall is that they reveal
the concept the child attaches to the word 'tall,' a concept
which is frequently different from that which the adult
attaches to the word (which is assumed to be tall).
As we have seen, psychologists attribute idiosyncratic
concepts to children on the basis of their production and
comprehension behaviour, concepts which are specified in terms
of lists of features. The conclusion that would be drawn from
Amy's responses would be that she represents the meaning of
'tall' as [Adj] [comparative] [+ polar] [_person, head to toe]
(as at Carey 1975:286). Her production and comprehension data
show that she underextends the word, and the underextension is
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explained by attributing to her a lexical entry more specific
than the adult's.
Now consider the case of Amy2, a little girl who is Amy's
double but lives in a linguistic community in which the
standard use of the word-form 'tall' is slightly different from
its use in English. 'Tall' in her community is correctly used
only for the comparative height of people. We may suppose that
this is the only difference between our language and the
dialect spoken in Amy2's community. This difference in usage
does not, however, impinge directly on Amy2; Amy and Amy2 hear
exactly the same sentences, uttered in indistinguishable
contexts, up to the time at which their comprehension of
spatial adjectives is tested. At this time Amy2 is brought
into the laboratory of a psychologist in our linguistic
community, alongside Amy, and is given exactly the same tests.
She of course responds in exactly the same way as Amy, insofar
as her responses are nonintentionally described; and like Amy,
she spontaneously applies the word 'tall' only to tall people.
But Amy2's production and comprehension behaviour reflects an
appropriate use of the word 'tall,' relative to the norms of
her home community.
How would Burge predict that the psychologist should
attribute concepts to Amy and Amy2? (We must, of course,
assume that our psychologist knows of the difference in the
dialects spoken in the girls' home communities.) On Burge's
view, the two girls should be attributed different concepts,
since they belong to different linguistic communities; Amy
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should be attributed an imperfect grasp of the concept tall,
while Amy2 is held to have a better grasp of a different
concept, that expressed by the word 'tall' in her community's
dialect.
But this is surely not how our psychologist will proceed.
We have already seen that Amy's use and comprehension of 'tall'
will be explained by attributing to her the lexical entry [Adj]
[comparative] [+ polar] [__person, head to toe]. Since
psychologists attribute idiosyncratic word meanings to
children, and do so by specifying lists of features, Amy2 will
be credited with exactly the same combination of features as
her lexical entry for 'tall,' despite the difference in usage
in her linguistic community.
It might be objected that the psychologist who ignores the
difference in the two girls' linguistic communities is
1
neglecting important information. Information about the
linguistic environments in which children have learned words is
of course useful and important; but it is useful and important
because it usually gives information about the ways in which
the child has heard the word applied. This does not mean that
it determines what lexical entry should be attributed to a
child, but that it is useful to know the input contributing to
the child's construction of the lexical entry attributed to
her. Thus even though the psychologist knows of the difference
in the dialect spoken in Amy's and Amy2's home communities, he
or she is not thereby obliged to attribute different lexical
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entries to them.
Furthermore, psychologists from both communities will
agree on this description of the two girls' representations of
the meaning of 'tall' (assuming, of course, that developmental
psychology is practised in the same way in Amy2's community).
The difference in the meaning of 'tall' in the children's
linguistic environments does not result in their being
attributed different representations of the meaning of the
word, as the anti-individualist predicts.
In the following sections I consider ways in which a
proponent of pan-anti-individualism in psychology--a person I
will call the Burgean--might object to the individualistic
interpretation of the thought-experiment.
4 Burgean Objections Considered.
4.1 First Objection.
One way in which the Burgean might respond is to argue that
content ascription is inappropriate in the case of Amy, on the
grounds that her linguistic behaviour is not systematic enough
to form the basis of an intentional attribution. According to
this view, the case of Amy should be assimilated to that of a
foreigner who hears and repeats English words without
understanding them. The claim is that the child, like the
foreigner, lacks the competence in using the word 'tall' which
is required for us to take her utterances of it seriously as
expressions of thoughts, or to credit her with any
comprehension of sentences containing it. If this is true, her
case cannot legitimately be presented as illuminating content
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individuation.
There are two possible ways in which the Burgean might
argue for this view. The first strategy is to appeal to
features of the specific example to support the claim that Amy
should not be attributed the concept tall. The Burgean who
adopts this strategy will have to appeal to an intuition that
Amy's behaviour with respect to the word 'tall' is too
unsystematic for content attribution to be appropriate. But
intuitions concerning this case surely accord with the
psychologists' practice; it seems reasonable to argue about
what Amy means by 'tall' but not about whether she means
anything by it.
The second strategy is to argue from a more general claim
about the propriety of attributing concepts to children on the
basis of their linguistic behaviour. The claim would be that
rather than attributing concepts to young children
indvidualistically on the basis of their linguistic behaviour,
psychologists should not attribute any concepts on the basis of
such evidence. The argument for this claim would be that young
children like Amy have too poor a grasp of language in general
to warrant attributing to them one lexical entry rather than
another on the basis of their utterances. Of course supporters
of this view must provide some alternative (and convincing)
explanation of the behaviour which psychologists explain in
terms of the use of semantic knowledge. Presumably children's
utterances will be explained as resulting largely from their
102
desire to imitate the sounds of adult speech, not of their
attaching some meaning (idiosyncratic or otherwise) to them
which they desire to convey. Children's reactions to verbal
instructions or questions will be viewed as determined
predominantly by non-verbal cues or by some predilection for
particular kinds of response (or both).
But these explanations are very implausible. We may
suppose that Amy, like many other four-year-old children, is
capable of initiating conversations by spontaneously asking
apparently meaningful questions, and of making what appear to
be cogent inferences from the answers she receives. Moreover,
children of this age are capable of conversing in this way on
what appear to be quite abstract topics (see e.g. the studies
cited in Carey 1985:26-28 which recount children's questions
about what happens after death). Such apparently intelligent
behaviour is far more plausibly explained as the result of
children's attaching meanings to words than as the result of
imitation and responses to non-verbal cues. Rather than Amy's
general linguistic competence being so poor as to cast
suspicion on her apparently systematic use of 'tall', her
behaviour supports the view that the word has meaning for her.
In addition to their individual weaknesses, these two
lines of argument are problematic for a common reason; they
flout the practice of psychologists. They are therefore
unacceptable to a Burgean who accepts Burge's methodological
point about how claims about individuation are to be assessed.
That point is expressed as follows:
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'What we know about individuation is derived from
reflecting on explanations and descriptions of ongoing
cognitive practices. Individuative methods are bound up
with the explanatory and descriptive needs of such
practices' (1986:18).
Given that the practice of developmental psychologists is to
attribute semantic knowledge to children like Amy, the Burgean
who claims that this practice is misguided and should be
discounted assumes a substantial burden of proof. That burden
becomes even heavier when we consider that developmental
psychologists explicitly distinguish cases like that of Amy, in
which idiosyncratic usage indicates that the child attaches a
different concept to a word from the adult, from cases in which
children's responses are taken to indicate that they do not
attach any concept to the word. In Carey's replication of a
classic study of the word 'alive,' for instance, some four-
year-olds could not give a definition of the word and sometimes
could not produce any examples of living things. When asked
whether various pictured objects (animate and inanimate) were
alive, they gave random judgements and inconsistent or
irrelevant justifications (Carey 1985:17ff). Such children
2
were judged not to have mapped the word onto a concept. The
situation with Amy is quite different. She uses and responds
to 'tall' perfectly systematically; she simply does not do so
in the manner standard in our linguistic community. She is
therefore interpreted as attaching to it a concept different
from that which it is standardly used to express.
It is part of developmental psychologists' practice to
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distinguish between cases in which children's behaviour does
and does not support the attribution of intentional states, and
Amy falls on the "content" side of the line thus drawn. The
Burgean who holds that she falls on the "no content" side must
therefore argue that the line as psychologists draw it is
wrongly drawn. Doubtless psychologists' practice is not
sacrosanct; there may be reasons to revise it. But as Burge
notes, the philosopher who proposes to revise scientific
practice must provide good reasons for the revision (1986:10).
The two arguments outlined above do not provide such reasons.
4.2 Second Objection.
An initially more promising Burgean objection would be that
although Amy is competent enough as a language user (her usage
is systematic enough) to support content attribution, it is to
be expected that the contents attributed would be
individualistically individuated. The argument here would be
that children like Amy are not full members of the linguistic
community and are not responsible to its norms of usage, and so
we would expect that their utterances would be reinterpreted
when they are ascribed beliefs or concepts. But this response
is of use only to the Burgean who is prepared to modify the
view that content individuation in cognitive psychology is non-
individualistic. The modified view would be that cognitive
psychology individuates individualistically in situations in
which common sense does so (e.g. when the subject is not
responsible to the linguistic norms of the community), and
otherwise individuates content non-individualistically. The
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claim that content is individuated individualistically in
developmental psychology is to be expected, on this view, if
children's utterances are reinterpreted when reporting their
beliefs in ordinary discourse.
One obvious problem with this response is that it
constitutes not a defence but a rejection of pan-anti-
individualism. If developmental psychology individuates
intentional states individualistically, as this response
concedes, then an important part of the anti-individualistic
case collapses.
In addition, the claim of the modified view that children
are not full members of the linguistic community is
problematic. Burge often suggests that membership is
established by patterns of deference to other's usage (e.g.
1979:101), and children surely defer to corrections by adults.
It is therefore not clear that reinterpretation of children's
utterances is to be expected on Burge's view of common sense
practice. The Burgean might try to use this point to challenge
the psychological treatment of the thought-experiment, arguing
that psychologists should not reinterpret children's utterances
precisely because children are members of the linguistic
community and should be taken at their word. But this, of
course, begs the question; why should a successful scientific
practice be revised to accord with a philosophical
reconstruction of nonscientific practice? To echo a remark
Burge makes in another context, the argument rests on a sketchy
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and unclear conception of linguistic community which is
unsupported by scientific practice (cf. Burge 1986a:z3).
4.3 Third Objection.
This objection is suggested by Burge's treatment of Marr's
theory of vision. In that account Burge argued for the
appropriateness of non-individualistic content individuation
not from the perceiving subject's deference to the linguistic
community, but from the assumption that the subject's
perception of the surrounding physical environment is
veridical. Presumably Burge would offer the claim that the
theory of vision assumes that visual perception is veridical in
support of his view that the "presuppositions" of psychology
are not (purely) individualistic. If perception is veridical,
a certain relation holds between visual representations and the
environmental objects they represent; and the fact that
psychology is concerned with the relations between perceiver
and environment 'helps motivate non-individualistic principles
of individuation,' in Burge's view (1986a:12). Essentially
Burge argues that since the theory assumes that people
successfully perceive what is in their environment, it will
attribute different visual perceptions to physical duplicates
who inhabit different environments.
The Burgean might base an argument for non-individualistic
individuation in the case of semantic development on an
analogous claim about the successfulness of the process of
learning word meanings. The claim would be that the aim of a
theory of semantic acquisition is to explain how children
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succeed in learning the meanings words have in their linguistic
environment. The theory thus presupposes that children do
succeed in learning those meanings. The analogous success-
based argument for the linguistic case would run as follows.
The theory assumes that children succeed in constructing
accurate representations of the meanings words have in their
linguistic environment, just as the theory of vision assumes
that people succeed in constructing accurate representations of
the objects in their physical environment. The aim of each
theory is to explain this success. In his discussion of Marr,
Burge presents what he calls a 'natural corollary' of this
assumption of success, namely that the content of tokens of a
representational type R constructed in perception is
individuated in terms of the 'distal causal antecedents' that
such tokens are about. The analogous corollary for the
semantic case is presumably that the content of a lexical entry
L constructed in semantic acquisition is individuated in terms
of the meaning of the word, uses of which lead to the
construction of L.
According to this view, psychologists should specify Amy's
lexical entry for 'tall' in terms of the communal or adult
concept the word expresses, accommodating her underextension of
the word by saying that she incompletely grasps or understands
3
the concept. Describing the meaning she attaches to the word
in terms of the adult concept is presumably specifying it by
how it deviates from that concept. Thus children who over- or
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under-extend words should be attributed the adult concept plus
or minus some features. But this is not how lexical entries
are usually specified. As indicated by the earlier discussion
of tests of Clark's hypothesis, lexical entries are specified
in terms of the features the child has extracted; and some of
these may be different from the features which compose the
adult entry for the same word. As Carey's model illustrates,
the relationship between the meanings which children and adults
represent may not be as straightforward as the Burgean proposal
assumes. Until the child has abstracted that 'tall' picks out
size along the vertical dimension, she may apply the word on
the basis of features quite different from those listed in the
adult lexical entry.
The Burgean might argue that the child's lexical entry can
still be specified with reference to the adult's, even if the
former contains features that the latter does not, if the
child's representation is described as the adult's with some
features added and others subtracted. But this route can only
be followed if the features of which the child's lexical entry
is composed are known, in which case psychologists would simply
specify the child's feature list directly. (It also
presupposes that the adult's feature list is known, which may
not be the case.)
Let us consider a more promising success-based argument
for non-individualistic individuation in developmental
psychology. Suppose that, as the Burgean claims, theorists of
semantic acquisition are interested in how word meanings are
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successfully learned, and that the standards for success are
set by the linguistic community to which the child belongs.
Suppose further that there is some slack in what counts as
success in learning, in that in each community there is a range
of slightly different uses of a term within which one must fall
to be considered to have successfully learned it. Given these
assumptions, the Burgean may generate a thought-experiment as
follows.
Consider two linguistic communities C1 and C2. Members of
C1 consider their children to have successfully learned the
meaning M1 which a certain word-form W1 has in their dialect
iff their usage of W1 falls within a range of uses RI1. Members
of C2 require that a child's usage of a certain word-form W2
fall within a range R2 if he or she is to be considered to have
learned the meaning M2 of W2. As it happens, word-forms W1 and
W2 are identical; and there is a child in C1, A, who uses W1 in
just the same way that B, a child in C2, uses W2. In fact A
and B have heard the word-form in exactly similar circumstances
and are for our purposes individualistically identical.
Furthermore, A's use of W1 falls within R1 and B's use of W2
falls within R2. If success in learning is evaluated with
respect to the standards of the local community, A will be
considered to have mastered meaning M1 and B to have mastered
meaning M2. But then mental contents are non-
individualistically individuated, for A and B use an identical
word-form in exactly the same way, and yet are attributed
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mastery of different meanings.
This interpretation of the thought-experiment may truly
represent an aspect of the common sense treatment of word
learning, but it does not accord with psychological practice.
As the earlier discussion of work on semantic development
showed, psychologists usually attribute children
representations of idiosyncratic meanings, not communally
established meanings; and these representations are specified
in terms of the list of features which the child is believed to
have constructed. In view of the last point, child A's lexical
entry for W1 and child B's lexical entry for W2 will probably
be specified in terms of features, not in terms of the meanings
M1 and M2 which are current in the children's respective
communities. Since psychologists attempt to discover which
features the child's lexical entry is composed of by examining
spontaneous utterances and responses on comprehension tasks,
and the two children's responses on such tasks are identical,
they will most likely be ascribed the same idiosyncratic
understanding of word-forms W1 and W2.
It is true that theorists of semantic acquisition assume
that most children do eventually construct lexical entries
which represent the socially accepted meaning of words, and
that they are interested in how such children succeed in doing
this. But although psychologists assume that the learning
mechanisms responsible for the child's construction and
revision of lexical entries are adequate to the task of
learning the meanings words have in the child's linguistic
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community, this does not commit them to describing the lexical
entries constructed during the learning process in terms of
communally accepted meanings.
4.4 Fourth Objection.
The Burgean might object that the experimental results
described in Section 3 do not warrant the conclusions about
children's representations of meanings which the psychologist
would draw from them. The objection would be that there are
explanations which do not involve the assumption that children
attach idiosyncratic meanings to words, but account equally
well for children's over- and under-extensions. The general
point I want to make in response, which I shall attempt to
substantiate for each specific alternative, is that
psychologists are aware of such alternative explanations, and
attempt to determine experimentally whether they are
appropriate in a particular case. If their results are not
consistent with the alternatives, they are committed to giving
explanations in terms of idiosyncratic meanings. Merely
invoking the possibility of alternative explanations is
therefore not sufficient to cast suspicion on explanations in
terms of idiosyncratic lexical entries.
For instance, a child who applies the word 'dog' to, say,
a sheep may know the correct meaning of the word, and therefore
know that her use of it is incorrect; but she may use it anyway
simply because she wants to communicate and does not yet know
the correct name for a sheep. Perhaps children attach the
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correct meanings to words, but overextend them because their
vocabularies are limited.
This explanation of overextensions was proposed by Bloom
(1973) and Clark (1983). As a result psychologists have
recognized that it is important to test for whether a child's
overextension of some word in production reflects the meaning
the child assigns to the word, or the child's communication
strategy. If the misuse is due to vocabulary limitations
alone, the child's responses on comprehension tasks involving
the word will be correct. If the word is also overextended in
comprehension, it is probable that the child attaches a
different meaning to it. Some overextensions are found in both
comprehension and production (e.g. Anglin 1977).
It has also been suggested that children's spontaneous
overextensions, like slips of the tongue, are the result of
errors in accessing correct lexical entries. For example,
Huttenlocher claims that it is more difficult for children to
retrieve the correct name when confronted with an object than
it is for them to retrieve information about the correct
referent of a word they hear (1974:366). Because of this, she
argues, the child may produce the wrong word for an object even
though his or her lexical entry for that word is correct. This
proposal can also be tested by comparing production and
comprehension, to see whether the overextension still occurs
when the word is provided as a cue.
A third alternative explanation is that children who over-
or under-extend words may attach the correct meaning to them,
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but misapply them because they have difficulty in determining
whether the conditions of application for the word are
satisfied. For example, a child may know that square A is
correctly described as bigger than square B if and only if the
area of square A is larger than that of square B; but if the
child computes the areas of the squares inaccurately, he or she
may still make the wrong choice when asked to pick the biggest
square. The point is a familiar Davidsonian one: the
misapplication of words may be due not to idiosyncratic word
meanings and correct beliefs about objects, but to correct word
meanings coupled with idiosyncratic beliefs about objects.
This explanation for misuses of words is mentioned by
Carey (1982:36-7), who notes that variation in the difficulty
of tasks may explain apparently inconsistent responses to
different questions involving the same word. Psychologists may
have a methodological preference for attributing children's
incorrect responses on comprehension tasks to idiosyncratic
word meanings, whereas in the case of adults the preference may
be for attributing idiosyncratic beliefs (though the
explanation favoured probably depends on the nature of the
tasks and responses as well as on the age of the respondent).
But again the alternative explanation is open to confirmation
or disconfirmation by the results of independent tests for the
hypothesized idiosyncratic beliefs. In the case of the example
given above, a child's difficulty in computing or comparing
areas should be revealed by discrimination tasks involving
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different verbal instructions.
The point which emerges from the examination of
explanations of under- and over-extensions which do not involve
attributing idiosyncratic lexical entries is that these
alternatives have been anticipated by experimenters and are
open to experimental test. Over- and under-extensions which
survive these tests are considered to be best explained as the
result of the child's attaching an idiosyncratic meaning to the
over- or under-extended word.
4.5 Fifth Objection.
In the presentation of the thought-experiment in Section 3, it
was noted that psychologists sometimes say that tests like
those given to Amy and Amy2 provide information about the
child's concept tall. Since psychologists also say that
responses such as Amy's and Amy2's indicate that the child's
concept tall differs from the adult's, it seems problematic to
interpret psychologists as attributing the adult (i.e.
communal) concept of tallness to the child. Therefore in the
discussion in Section 3 it was suggested that when
psychologists make remarks such as these, they are actually
speaking elliptically about the concept the child has attached
to the word 'tall.' (Indeed, this is all that comprehension
4
tests can reveal.)
The Burgean may object to this metalinguistic
interpretation of the psychologists' remarks, insisting that
their use of a word used deviantly by the child in describing
the child's concepts shows that they individuate the child's
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mental representations in terms of communal concepts. With
particular reference to the thought-experiment, the Burgean
might argue that psychologists would explain Amy's behaviour by
saying that she attaches the concept of tallness of people to
'tall,' or that she thinks of tallness as a property only of
people.
Psychologists might well describe Amy's situation in this
way. But they will also describe the concept Amy attaches to
'tall' as [Adj] [comparative] [+ pole] [_ person, head to toe],
and this suggests that remarks such as those mentioned above do
not have the deep significance which the Burgean attaches to
them. Consider this quotation from Carey's defence of her
proposal about children's lexical entries for comparative
spatial adjectives:
'Suppose the child first learns 'deep' and 'shallow' as
applying to ends of pools. If he can use the words
correctly faced with novel swimming pools, not confusing
depth with length or width of the pool, then certainly
he has the concept of depth of swimming pools. But he
may not see the similarity between the way that the deep
end of a swimming pool is deep and the way that bowls,
holes, and puddles are deep. He may not know that
'deep' can apply where there is no contrast between two
parts of a single object, or that it does not require a
liquid medium. Each of these, plus many other
irrelevant features, may be part of his unanalyzed
conception of the depth of pools' (1978:287).
The purpose of this passage is to point out that although the
child may be said to have the concept of depth of swimming
pools (or tallness of people), this does not mean that the
child possesses the adult or communal concept of dep,th (or
tallness). The child has not yet developed the feature system
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in terms of which the adult concepts of depth and tallness are
represented. Thus the concept represented by the child's
feature list is only roughly conveyed by words which express
the adult concepts the child has not yet acouired.
The primary importance of the feature list as a
description of the concept the child attaches to a word is
illustrated by the following observation about the thought-
experiment described in Section 3. Psychologists from our
and Amy2's speech communities may both use the word 'tall' in
describing the semantic competence of the child from their
community; but of course the word will have a different meaning
in the mouths of theorists from the two communities. The
Burgean wants to use this difference to argue that a difference
in linguistic environment makes for a difference in the
children's mental contents. But psychologists will agree that
both children's lexical entries for 'tall' consist of the
features [Adj] (comparative] [+ pole] [_ person, head to toe].
All that is needed to defeat the Burgean is a case in which
psychologists ascribe the same concept (i.e. same semantic
features) to two children on the basis of the children's use of
a word w, even though the children come from linguistic
communities in which w has a different meaning.
At this point the Burgean may point out that psychologists
interested in conceptual development attribute to children
concepts which the children have not yet mapped onto words.
For instance, Carey writes that
'although young children map a different concept onto
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the word "animal" than do adults, there is no doubt that
a concept animal with the same extension as the adult's
plays an important role in their thought...Nonetheless
animal functions in the thought of 10-year-olds and
adults differently than it functions in the thought of
young children' (1985:183).
These remarks about the child's concept animal obviously cannot
be interpreted metalinguistically, as remarks about the concept
the child has mapped onto the word 'animal' (as we interpreted
remarks about the child's concept tall); Carey's point is
precisely that the child's concept animal has not yet been
mapped onto 'animal.' It seems that in this case the child is
attributed the adult or communally established concept, even
though the child's conception of animals is different from the
adult's ('young children do not realize that all animals eat,
breathe, and reproduce'; Carey 1985:183).
However, even if we grant that the Burgean may be able to
generate a thought-experiment on the basis of cases such as
these, it will not suffice to reinstate pan-anti-individualism;
that view requires that children's concepts are always
described in terms of those current in the child's community.
Moreover, such cases hardly suffice to show that there is a
'necessary or deep individuative relation' between the contents
of thinkers' mental states and their social environments, as
Burge maintains (1986a:4). It is just as plausible that
children are described as incompletely grasping the communal
concept (as opposed to being credited with an idiosyncratic
concept) when the features composing the child's concept are
not yet known. If this is so, the non-individualistic mode of
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description is adopted largely for convenience, and may be
abandoned if the underlying features are discovered.
5 Conclusion.
According to the Burgean "pan-anti-individualist" view of the
content of psychological states, the intentional states
attributed in psychology are individuated with respect to
subjects' linguistic environments. This means that a person's
being in some intentional psychological state necessarily
involves her occupying a particular sort of linguistic
environment; a subject who was physically and functionally
identical to her, but occupied a linguistic environment that
was different in some relevant respect, would be in a different
intentional state. Amy and Amy2 are physical and functional
twins who belong to linguistic communities which are relevantly
different; the fact that the word-form 'tall' has a different
meaning in the two societies should, on the Burgean view,
result in their being considered to attach different concepts
to the word. Yet, as we have seen, this difference in
linguistic environment does not require developmental
psychologists to judge that Amy and Amy2 represent different
meanings for the word-form 'tall.' In fact, our examination of
current models of semantic development suggests that the two
girls would be attributed the same lexical entry for the word
'tall.' The case of Amy and Amy2 thus provides a
counterexample to the pan-anti-individualist thesis; it shows
that there is at least one area of cognitive psychology which
is not purely non-individualistic.
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If Burge is correct in claiming that Marr's theory of
vision is non-individualistic, what differences between this
theory and the theory of semantic development might account for
the difference in content individuation in the two fields? One
difference is that according to Burge's analysis, Marr's work
implicitly assumes a causal or covariance theory of content.
This forms the basis of Burge's argument that the theory is
committed to attributing different representational states to
individualistically identical subjects occupying environments
in which the normal causes of perceptual states are different.
Regardless of whether this analysis of content individuation in
Marr's theory is right, it cannot be extended to cases in which
it is the role of linguistic or social environment in
determining content which is at issue. A causal theory of
content is no help here, for the communally established
standards of linguistic usage are not the normal causes of the
psychological states, the content of which they are supposed to
partially determine. It is not linguistic norms which cause
children to construct lexical entries, but the adult utterances
to which they are exposed.
However, there is a parallel between the theory of vision
and the theory of semantic development, a parallel to which
Burge attaches great importance. As mentioned earlier, both
theories are "success-oriented" (or at least not "success-
neutral," in Burge's phrase). Burge bases a general argument
for the non-individualistic nature of psychology on the claim
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that psychological theories of our various cognitive activities
presuppose that we are successful in our interactions with our
environment (1986a:44). He argues that this motivates
psychologists
'to frame explanations that account for these successes,
and correlative failures, in such a way as to illumine
as specifically as possible the mechanisms that underlie
and make true our evaluations [sc. of the activities as
successful]' (1986:25).
It is true that psychologists assume that children eventually
succeed in discovering the meanings words have in their
surrounding communities, and that the aim of research in
semantic acquisition is to discover the mechanisms which enable
them to do this. But what exactly does this assumption of
success come to? Applied to the case of semantic development,
Burge's interpretation ascribes to developmental psychologists
the strong assumption that children eventually converge on the
socially established meanings of words. But it is just as
plausible that theorists of semantic development, like
theorists of the acquisition of syntax, make the weaker
assumption that each child eventually acquires a knowledge of
language which permits him or her to communicate successfully
with others in the community (cf. Chomsky 1986:16). Successful
communication need only require that each child's lexical entry
for a word is similar to the lexical entries of other members
of the community.
Even if we suppose that developmental psychologists adopt
the strong version of the assumption of success, it is hard to
see why this would commit them to individuating representations
121
of word meanings non-individualistically. Specifying the early
idiosyncratic lexical entries the child constructs in terms of
features provides no obstacle to the project of explaining how
a child eventually acquires the correct meaning of a word.
Moreover, specifying the child's meanings simply in terms of
how they deviate from the typical adult's actually might be an
obstacle to discovering the principles guiding the child's
construction of lexical entries. If, rather than knowing which
elements of a word's meaning the child has acquired, we know
only which elements she lacks, we will have less to guide us in
determining the mechanisms responsible for child's acquiring
those elements she has acquired.
I conclude that Burge's pan-anti-individualist view of
content individuation in psychology is false. This does not
mean that psychological states are never individuated non-
individualistically. But even if lexical entries are sometimes
attributed with reference to linguistic environment, the fact
that they usually are not shows that there is not the deep or
necessary relation between psychological states and linguistic
environment that Burge believes there to be.
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Notes.
[1] In fact this is not strong enough for the anti-
individualist; information about a child's linguistic
environment is not merely important but essential to specifying
the child's lexical entries correctly. If linguistic
environment is a partial determinant of the content of
psychological states, a developmental psychologist who is
ignorant of the linguistic affiliation of one of his or her
subjects cannot reliably specify that child's representations
of word meanings. If psychology is non-individualistic, a
psychologist who attributed the same lexical entry to Amy and
Amy2 would be making a mistake.
[2] The attribution of idiosyncratic meanings is also seen in
this study. More advanced children interpreted 'alive' as
meaning 'capable of activity or movement,' and therefore
overextended the word, applying it to inanimate objects such as
clocks 'because they go tick-tock' (Carey 1985:30).
[3] Here, as elsewhere, I assume for simplicity that the
correct meaning and the adult meaning coincide for the word in
question.
[4) This is not always remembered. According to Carey
(1985:18), Piaget attempted to chart the development of the
concept alive in children by probing their understanding of the
word 'alive.' But, as she points out, 'the word "alive" may
not actually be mapped onto the child's concept that most
closely approximates the adult's concept living thing'
(1985:19). 1 suspect that studies of children's comprehension
of a word 'X' are only described by psychologists as revealing
the child's concept X when children are found to attach a
concept to 'X' which-is similar to that which adults attach to
it.
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